Election Analysis
The Second Debate: What It Means
The key question from the second presidential debate is not whether President Obama won. He clearly did, by every measurement. The question is whether it will matter to the trajectory of the race the way the first one did. History indicates that it probably will not; in past elections, far more people have watched the first debate, and had their opinions shaped by it, than any subsequent debates.
Although the president did extremely well last night, probably the best his supporters can hope for is that it freezes the race and stops his precipitous polling slide of the last two weeks. If he accomplished that much, then he is still close enough that he can possibly squeak it out at the end with a really strong closing sprint.
But liberals should not be deluded that last night’s strong performance by the president will undo the horrendous damage he suffered in the first debate. At this point, it is clear that it will be a dogfight for him to win this thing. What, if any, effect his performance last night will have in the polling will probably be clear in a week’s time.
How A Beleaguered Democratic President Reversed The Tide
The Republican candidate for president was certainly a handsome man. People had to grant him that, if they were willing to grant him nothing else. Born in Michigan, he had made his bones as a northeastern governor, and there was no question that the man looked like a president.
The incumbent Democratic president was struggling. Having taken on the controversial issue of universal health care coverage early in his administration, he had lost his initial high approval ratings, and his party had been crushed in the midterm elections. Faced with stubborn Republican opposition in Congress, determined to deny the president any victories he could use as a springboard for the election, he had been unable to accomplish much of anything domestically since the Republicans had won the midterms. His major domestic accomplishment, an executive order to end discrimination in the military, had been met with howls of outrage on the right and resistance from the military brass, who claimed “unit cohesion” would suffer. His advisers had warned him that this move could cost him many of the states he needed to win the election.
The president was likeable enough, but sometimes he seemed to have a hard time making his case with the electorate. He was often unfavorably compared with the previous Democratic president, whose legendary ability to connect with the common people made him the most popular political figure of his day, even now, these many years after he had left office; the current president, compared with the last Democrat to hold the office, often seemed a bit wanting. Even the former president’s wife, a political legend in her own right, was more popular than he was.
Although the president had won some spectacular victories overseas, domestically he was floundering, and the people were ready for a change.
On the other side of the aisle, the Republicans were giddy. Their midterm triumph and the president’s continued struggles led them to believe it was a foregone conclusion that they would win the White House and Congress in the next election. The only question was whether they would nominate the favorite, the moderate northeastern governor who had run well but lost four years previously, or one of his more conservative rivals.
The truth of the matter was that the right-wingers did not trust this frontrunner of theirs, and they wanted someone more conservative. They placed their hopes in a far-right, Rust Belt Senator. But the conservatives were fractured, and the northeastern governor, though he was too moderate for the base, won the nomination nonetheless. Querulous conservatives, though unhappy with their nominee, grumbled a bit but fell in line. Any Republican, they felt, would be better than this president, and any Republican would surely beat him.
But certain problems began to emerge for the Republican candidate. Before long, it became clear that his personality, aloof and standoffish, was a liability. He was stiff and ham-handed, and even though he had been raised in the Midwest, he found it difficult to connect with the common people in that key region. (One of his contemporaries had remarked that he was the only man she knew who could strut while sitting down.) He also found, to his dismay, that he could not shake the record of the previous Republican president, whose economic policies had created the greatest economic disaster in recent memory.
The Democratic president, meanwhile, had begun to find his stride. After struggling for most of his administration to find his own voice, he had rediscovered himself on the campaign trail and came alive on the stump. What had once been considered an impossible campaign for the Democrats to win now began to show signs of hope, and the polls began to move in the president’s direction. Still, Republicans believed they would win. How could they lose, against this president?
When all the dust settled, the unbeatable Republican ticket had lost, and it wasn’t close. The Democratic president, to everyone’s surprise, had come back from the political dead and won comfortably, with more than 300 electoral votes. He had managed to win key states such as Ohio, Virginia, Wisconsin, Colorado, Iowa and Nevada, all of which had been in doubt but had ultimately gone Democratic. His party had also reversed the Republican gains from the midterm elections two years previously as voters deserted the GOP in the final weeks of the campaign.
By now, you’ve probably figured out that this little tale was the story of the 1948 election featuring President Harry S. Truman and New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey.
What, you were thinking this story was about somebody else?
Unconventional Success at Democratic Convention
I returned to Chicago yesterday from the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina. After 13 hours of uninterrupted sleep, a few observations:
1) The Democrats are finally starting to understand that politics, for most voters, comes from the gut, not from the head. The average voter is much less interested in policy statements than how a candidate or party makes him or her feel.
I was in the hall for two of the three nights, and everything seemed geared toward maximum emotional impact. Michelle Obama’s speech emphasized: I’m a mom, I’m a wife, we’re a normal family, we’re just like you. Most importantly, she sought connection with the overwhelming majority of the voting public along economic lines: without mentioning Mitt Romney’s name, Mrs. Obama adroitly noted that when Barack picked her up for a date, the door of his modest car was rusted through, something we surely will never hear from Ann Romney. And her line about how it’s not how much you earn, it’s what good you do hammered the point home.
When the Democrats brought in Gabrielle Giffords to recite the Pledge of Allegiance on Wednesday night, I nearly cried. I’m sure there were others who shot right past almost.
Everything was perfectly scripted to provoke emotional triggers, and I think it largely succeeded. No high-minded logical arguments, no mind-numbing 23-point plans. If anybody could boil down the key message and tone of the Democratic Convention this year, it was basically this: We’re much more like you than the Republicans are (therefore we care about more about you than they do), and we’re nicer. The red meat for the delegates (and there was plenty, particularly in the speech of former Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland) was largely confined to time slots that weren’t widely televised.
And while President Obama’s speech was panned by many pundits (and by me) as providing nothing we hadn’t heard before, its purpose, I believe, has been largely misunderstood. The president wasn’t attempting to impress the people in the hall. He was attempting to restore the emotional connection he forged with the voters in 2008, most of whom haven’t really been paying much attention since. The people I talked to who were in the building unanimously agreed with me that the speech wasn’t Obama’s best and that it was all basically rehashed, old sound bytes. But the people I talked to who saw it on TV really liked it, and that’s what mattered, because they are the people the president needs to reconnect with and win over again. You don’t use a speech to 35 million people to preach to the converted. If the speech was old hat to me and the other people I talked to on the way out of Time Warner Cable Arena, it wasn’t necessarily so to the viewing audience at home.
2) The Democrats won the two-week convention period and did so handily. Polling in the wake of the Republican event in Tampa demonstrated very little of a bump for Romney; to the degree that he got one at all, he went from trailing 49-47 to tied 48-48. While the effects of the Democratic convention will need a few days to fully develop, coming out of the conventions ahead, as he will, is a win for Obama. Very few candidates who aren’t ahead after both conventions are over ultimately win the election. I’d have to do some research to say this for sure, but I think the last one was Harry Truman in 1948. And Mitt Romney is no Harry Truman.
I’ve been saying for weeks that if Romney didn’t come out of the conventions ahead, he would lose the election (barring some unforeseen catastrophe for Obama). I see nothing at this point that changes my analysis.
3) The Democrats will make bigger gains in the U.S. House than people expect. I was fortunate to attend a Democratic briefing on the upcoming House races. Of course, I immediately dismissed a lot of what they said as biased and overly optimistic, and naturally so: you don’t tell a group of potential donors, “Hey, there’s no way in hell we’re going to reclaim the House this year, so you can put your money away, boys and girls.” But they did offer some convincing polling and fundraising statistics that led me to conclude there is at least an outside possibility they could wrest the House from the Republicans. Personally, I still wouldn’t bet a lot of money on that happening (despite their rather optimistic claims), but there are some races that are polling more competitively than anyone expected at the start of the cycle.
I’m not going to say any more, because it was a closed briefing and I don’t want to say anything that could tip off the other side. But I will say that I came out of the room slightly more optimistic than when I entered. I think the battle for the U.S. House will be closer than expected and that the final spread will be in the single digits.
How The Campaign Is Shaping Up
Advertising patterns demonstrate that there are really only eight states that are in doubt at this time. Barring an unexpected occurrence between now and election day, President Barack Obama is virtually a lock to win 247 electoral votes on November 6th, and Mitt Romney is a virtual lock to win 191.
With 270 electoral votes needed to win, Obama has a much easier path to victory than Romney does, and in fact could win the election if he just wins the states he is expected to win and also takes Florida. Obama has six paths to victory that involve winning half of the swing states or fewer; Romney has zero paths to victory that involve winning fewer than five of the eight swing states.
Based on where the campaigns are advertising, the eight swing states are: Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, Virginia, Colorado, Iowa, Nevada and New Hampshire.
Obama’s Paths to 270
1) Florida
2) Ohio plus any one of North Carolina, Virginia, Colorado, Iowa or Nevada
3) North Carolina plus Virginia or Colorado
4) Virginia plus Colorado and any other swing state
5) Virginia plus any two of the following three states: Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire
6) Colorado plus Nevada, Iowa and New Hampshire
Immediate Conclusions
Florida can win it for Obama by itself.
Ohio needs only to be paired with one other swing state (except New Hampshire).
Either Virginia or Colorado figure into every path except the shortest one (Florida).
New Hampshire only has the potential to be relevant in three scenarios, and those are dependent on several other occurrences happening. The likelihood of New Hampshire deciding the election is fairly remote.
According to Nate Silver’s Five Thirty Eight Blog, Obama’s odds in the swing states, from best to worst, are as follows:
1) Nevada
2) New Hampshire
3) Ohio
4) Iowa
5) Colorado
6) Virginia
7) Florida
8) North Carolina
If Obama wins Nevada and Ohio, two of his three best swing states at this time, he wins the election. Therefore, his best path is to focus on Ohio and Nevada.
Either Virginia or Colorado figure into almost every scenario, so these states also should be given top-priority attention.
Iowa figures into as many scenarios as Nevada, but there is only one scenario where Obama needs Iowa if he wins Nevada. Nevada looks like a likelier win, so Nevada should be prioritized over Iowa.
Although Florida is one of the longest shots for Obama to hold, its potential to wrap the election up for Obama, even if he wins no other swing states, dictate that it should be given attention. If nothing else, tying up Romney’s resources in Florida keeps him from spending more money in the more crucial states.
New Hampshire, with only four electoral votes, is unlikely to be decisive, and Obama’s hardest lift is North Carolina. If resources have to be husbanded down the stretch, these two states should be conceded.
In short, the Obama campaign should do as follows:
1) Focus heavily on Ohio, Nevada, Virginia and Colorado.
2) Compete in Florida, but not to the detriment of Ohio, Nevada, Virginia and Colorado.
3) Give as much attention to Iowa as possible without jeopardizing efforts in Ohio, Nevada, Virginia, Colorado or Florida.
4) Give enough attention to New Hampshire to keep it competitive in the unlikely event that it is needed.
5) Concede North Carolina. While it can be won with a great effort, it is too heavy of a lift to justify the expenditure of resources that would be necessary.
The math is much trickier for Romney, who must win at least five of the eight swing states to win the election. He cannot possibly win without taking Florida, and it will be exceptionally difficult for him to win without taking Ohio, North Carolina and Virginia. If Romney loses Ohio, he must win every other swing state. If he loses North Carolina or Virginia, he must win Florida, Ohio, Colorado, and two of the remaining three swing states (Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire). If he loses North Carolina and Virginia, or North Carolina and Colorado, he cannot win.
Romney’s Paths To 270
1) Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, Virginia and any other swing state
2) Florida, Ohio, Colorado, plus North Carolina or Virginia, and any two of the remaining three swing states (Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire)
3) Every swing state except Ohio
Immediate Conclusions
Romney cannot win without winning Florida.
If Romney loses Ohio, he has to win all seven remaining swing states.
Losing North Carolina or Virginia would force Romney to win at least six of the remaining seven swing states, including Florida, Ohio, Virginia and Colorado. (However, he could lose Virginia and Colorado and still reach 269 by sweeping the remaining swing states; assuming Republicans maintain control of a majority of U.S. House delegations, which seems likely at this time, a 269-269 tie in the electoral college would mean the election of Romney by the House.)
In short, the Romney campaign should do as follows:
1) Win Florida at all costs. There is no chance of victory without winning Florida.
2) Focus heavily on Ohio, North Carolina and Virginia, as any combination not involving these three states, plus Florida, makes victory a near impossibility.
3) Spend heavily in Colorado, which is his next-best bet.
4) Assume Obama does not spend heavily in New Hampshire and capitalize there.
5) Concede Nevada and focus on Iowa. Unless Romney loses Ohio, he doesn’t need both, and Iowa looks slightly better for Romney than Nevada does.
The Bottom Line
Of the eight states in doubt, there are no scenarios in which Romney can be elected without winning at least five of those states. However, Obama has a path that requires him to win only one of those eight states, two paths that require him to win only two of those states, and two more that require him to win only three of the eight swing states. Obama has six ways to win that require victories in four of the eight swing states or fewer. In short, Obama has a considerable advantage in the Electoral College and can spare his resources by focusing in on four or five of the swing states; Romney must go all-out in at least seven of those states to have a real chance to win.
Only two states are crucial to both candidates: Ohio and Virginia. Television viewers there can count on three more months of advertising saturation.
Lack Of Strategy, Discipline Equals Unnecessary Defeat In Wisconsin
Did you hear about the big win for the Democrats in Wisconsin Tuesday night?
I’m completely serious.
The Democrats retook the Wisconsin State Senate on Tuesday by winning a swing district centered in Racine County, in the southeastern corner of the state. Former state senator John Lehman, a Democrat, defeated incumbent Republican Van Wanggaard to reclaim the seat Wanggaard took from Lehman in 2010. The result is that Democrats now hold a 17-16 advantage in the Wisconsin Senate, and Republicans will need to net at least one seat in November—or face the end of Gov. Scott Walker’s ability to do anything without Democratic consent for the rest of his term.
This was a huge win for the Democrats.
But you probably didn’t hear about it, because Wisconsin’s Democrats also made the mistake of trying to recall Walker. And we all know what happened there. Walker, buoyed by both monetary and structural advantages, easily defeated Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett for the second time in three years. The national media have been talking about it non-stop.
Today, Democrats across the country are disappointed and disheartened, and Democrats in Wisconsin have about $4 million less at their disposal for the elections this fall. But hey, there’s nothing much important happening in November—just a presidential race and an open-seat U.S. Senate race that could determine control of Congress.
And, sure, Republicans had to spend $30 million defending Walker from being recalled, but in the post-Citizens United world, does anyone think they’ll miss it, with their wealthy donors ready to spend whatever it takes to defeat Democrats at every level across the country?
This was a victory we didn’t need to hand to the Republicans, but we did it anyway. Why?
Because, as has been amply demonstrated once again, we on the left have absolutely no discipline and no ability to see past our own righteous indignation and think strategically.
For the record, I’m not talking out of sheer hindsight here. I was against the attempt to recall Walker from the start, and I discussed my reasons in an earlier post from May 15. As much as I wish I had been completely wrong, my post shows pretty clearly that I saw this whole fiasco coming. Why couldn’t the Democrats of Wisconsin see it?
Recalling Walker wasn’t necessary, and frankly, we were never going to beat him anyway. The way gubernatorial recalls in Wisconsin are set up give a huge institutional advantage to the incumbent. While Democrats had to go through a primary, and only had a month to regroup for the general recall, Walker had tons of time to raise money and go on the airwaves before the Democrats could even select a nominee. The recall was lost before the Democrats had even settled on a candidate.
What was far more important than getting Walker was depriving Walker of his ability to pass laws. That’s why the legislative recalls that started in 2011 were, in contrast to the Walker recall, a sound idea—but also poorly executed.
Democrats in 2011 went after six Republican Senators, but they never had a hope in hell of beating more than three of them. They did defeat two and narrowly missed beating a third, which would have given them control of the Senate. If they hadn’t wasted resources firing blindly and going after three Republican Senators they were never going to beat, maybe they could have picked up that third seat and won the Senate in 2011.
This year, Democrats went after four more Republican Senators, two of whom they never had any chance whatsoever to beat. A third, Pam Galloway, resigned rather than face the recall and was replaced on the ballot by her predecessor, who ended up being a far stronger candidate and winning. They did manage to beat Wanggaard to take the Senate, a terrific symbolic victory that would have made national headlines—if, of course, the Democrats had not taken on Walker and lost. But aside from the symbolic value, which we threw away, winning the state Senate right now means very little. The legislature went out of session in May and won’t reconvene until after the election. Winning the Senate in 2011, before the 2012 legislative session, would have been far more useful.
So let’s review. Democrats in Wisconsin went after 10 state Senators in two years—five of whom they never had a chance in hell of beating—and ultimately defeated three. In half of those races, they’d have done just as well to set their money on fire. And by losing a race against Walker that they never should have run, they stepped all over what could have been their headline, the headline that could have gotten Democrats across the country inspired and ready to rally for November: Democrats Take Wisconsin Senate. But nobody noticed that in the wake of Walker’s win, and now it’s the Republicans who are pumped up and ready to run through walls heading into the fall elections.
Oh, and by the way, how much harder is it going to be now to beat Walker in 2014, now that he has prevailed and also demonstrated how much money he can raise? Top-tier Democrats may well steer clear of taking him on now. We Democrats didn’t just fail to take Scott Walker out in 2012; we just made him stronger and probably cleared his path to a second term. Brilliant.
I understand why Wisconsin Democrats were angry after Walker and the Republicans gutted public-sector unions in 2011. Democrats everywhere, including myself, were livid about it. But until we Democrats learn to channel our anger—and think clearly and strategically rather than just lashing out in all directions—we will continue to blow opportunities and hand needless victories to the Republicans.
I’m sure a lot of people won’t like what I’ve said here, but dammit, somebody had to say it. If we don’t learn a little discipline and a little strategic thinking, we’re never going to win elections except in years when Republicans screw up so badly (see 2006, 2008) that the country can’t stomach them anymore.
And as we are learning, those rare, lucky victories don’t last long (see 2010). Wake up, Democrats. We need to learn to ask questions first and shoot later.
On the Wisconsin Recall: A Post I Really Hate To Write
Let me start out by saying that this is a post I really hate to write. I am a liberal, pro-union Democrat who grew up in a blue-collar home. Most of my adult male relatives, during my childhood, were members of the United Steelworkers of America. So I am angry as hell at what has been done to unions and collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin and several other states.
That’s why I really hate to write this post.
But I have been saying all along that I thought the effort of Wisconsin Democrats to recall Gov. Scott Walker, the architect of Wisconsin’s union-busting effort, was a huge mistake. And it’s beginning to look like I was probably right, because the Wisconsin Democrats are screaming for money. That’s usually a very bad sign about the prospects for any political race. Almost all polling has shown a very tight race between Walker and Mayor Tom Barrett (D-Milwaukee), but the polling also has consistently shown Walker slightly ahead and Democrats unable to quite get over the hump.
Yesterday, the Washington Post reported that Wisconsin Democrats were “furious” that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Democratic Governors’ Association (DGA) were not spending tons of money to help combat the insane amount of out-of-state money Walker is bringing in. A new story today indicates that the DGA actually is coming in with $2 million, and that’s appropriate, given that this is a governor’s race, and there aren’t all that many governors’ races this year.
But expecting the DNC to come in is pretty unrealistic. The Wisconsin Democrats—God love them—have gotten in over their heads, and now they expect the national party to come in and bail them out. Perhaps it didn’t cross the mind of Wisconsin Democrats that maybe the DNC has, ahem, bigger fish to fry in a presidential election year?
Ed Schultz, on his MSNBC show last night, also called out for national money to get into the race. I forget which commentator said it yesterday—might have been Schultz; I apologize if I’m not remembering correctly—that the Wisconsin recall is the most important race this year. Sorry, but I have to disagree. I think it is an absolute no-brainer that reelecting President Obama is our most urgent priority in 2012. And that’s why, if the DNC decides not to play in the Wisconsin recall, that I will grudgingly support that decision. If we have to make a choice between defeating Walker and reelecting Obama, the correct choice should be obvious to everybody.
My problem with the recall attempt against Walker is not that I have any sympathy for Scottie. Not at all. Personally, I hate what he’s done in Wisconsin. But I think it was a very bad strategic move, largely due to the timing. Listen, a lot of money and effort is going into this recall that could have been spent to help elect Congresswoman Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) to the U.S. Senate. She’s going to have a difficult race, as will Democrats seeking to reclaim a couple of U.S. House seats in Wisconsin we lost last time.
Taking out Walker was always going to be dicey, a 50-50 shot at best. Imagine what happens if our side spends all this time and effort and money—and loses. It’ll be like letting the air out of a balloon. How much energy—or money—will our side have left for November after a deflating loss in Wisconsin on June? And that jeopardizes Baldwin, our U.S. House candidates, and possibly even President Obama’s prospects in Wisconsin, a state he really can’t afford to lose if the presidential race ends up being close.
Worse yet, a Walker win on June 5th will be an incredible shot in the arm to national Republicans. If he does win, we can expect a surge of GOP enthusiasm—and donations. It will also send a clear message that politicians in other states who want to get tough on unions have nothing to fear. Scott Walker will have shown them the way.
It doesn’t appear that Wisconsin Democrats considered any of these possibilities when they decided to take a shot at Walker in the middle of the 2012 elections. Well, you know what they say: if you’re going to shoot at the king, you’d better not miss. Because a lot more is riding on this thing than anyone seems to understand, and I’m getting the very disquieting sense that Democrats in Badgerland have bitten off more than they can chew.
I sure hope I’m wrong.