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Biden Clear Favorite To Win Presidency; Democratic Trifecta Likely

by Cliston Brown | Nov 1, 2020 | Election Analysis

Map provided courtesy of 270towin.com

On the eve of the 2020 elections, it is clear that Joe Biden is a heavy favorite to win the presidency and become the next president of the United States. For Donald Trump to win would require either the largest collective polling error recorded since 1936, or a massive, government-orchestrated theft of an election that would shame even the lowest “third-world” tyrant.

At this point, the only question is the margin. As of today, I expect Biden to win all of the six key states that will determine the winner in the Electoral College. I further expect that he will win by clear margins in the three most important of those six states: Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. All available evidence points to these results.

To make my final projections, I am using the Real Clear Politics site (https://www.realclearpolitics.com), which I have chosen for two reasons: one, it has a very good, comprehensive listing of most available polling going back well over a year, and two, it tends to produce the least favorable results for Biden, as compared to other sites which aggregate polling data. To explain further—if Biden is clearly leading in a state at the RCP site, I believe one can count on him being ahead there.

First, let’s look at the three most pivotal states, the large “Rust Belt” states that gave Donald Trump the presidency in 2016. At this point, there is no way any reasonable person can look at the available data and conclude that Trump is not a significant underdog in these three pivotal states.

PENNSYLVANIA (20 electoral votes)

In 72 polls of Pennsylvania dating back to February, Trump has led two and been tied in three. He was trailing all polling in the Keystone State even before the COVID-19 pandemic shut down the country. There has been no notable movement in his direction. At this point, the evidence points to a projection of “Likely Democratic,” but I am going to keep Pennsylvania at “Leans Democratic” simply because the polling margins are somewhat close.

MICHIGAN (16 electoral votes)

In 61 polls of Michigan dating back to February, Trump has led four, none by more than 2%. All four of those polls were conducted by the Republican pollster Trafalgar. It is clearly “Likely Democratic,” and the only reason it cannot be moved into the “Safe Democratic” category is an abundance of caution based on the surprising results of 2016.

WISCONSIN (10 electoral votes)

In 59 polls of Wisconsin dating back to February, Trump has led three and has been tied in three. Two of his leads were by 1% each, both in polling done by the Republican pollster Trafalgar. Again, evidence clearly points to a projection of “Likely Democratic.”

Moving now to three other hotly contested states, it is clear again that Biden is ahead, although a Trump win in any of them would not be considered a major upset.

FLORIDA (29 electoral votes)

Of all of the six key states that will determine the election, Florida is the hardest one to project. That said, Biden has led in many more polls than Trump, even though the margins have typically been close. Disturbing reports of Biden doing poorly (relatively speaking) among Latinos in Florida certainly give one pause, but his surprising strength among older voters is important here too, and appears to be offsetting any softness in his Latino numbers. It appears that if Trump does win Florida, it will be by a margin similar to that of George W. Bush in 2000. If a candidate’s best case is a photo-finish, one can’t call him the favorite. I am going to bite the bullet and characterize Florida as “Tilts Democratic.”

NORTH CAROLINA (15 electoral votes)

There is no question about two facts: North Carolina is very close, and Biden has led the overwhelming majority of polls, particularly polls not conducted by Trafalgar or Rasmussen, also a Republican-leaning pollster. Unlike in other states that I consider part of the “Big Six”—the six key states that will decide the election—Trump has also led here in polls that are not clearly Republican skewed, though not recently. But most of the polling has favored Biden by a close but clear margin. Therefore, North Carolina has to be characterized as “Leans Democratic.”

ARIZONA (11 electoral votes)

Although Biden has led in the overwhelming majority of polling taken since February, Trump has moved ahead in three of the last seven polls. However, two of those three were conducted by Republican-leaning pollsters (Trafalgar and Rasmussen). I learned a hard lesson in 2016, which is that just because a pollster is partisan does not necessarily mean it is wrong. Their numbers have to be thrown in the averages. However, when the only polling showing a Republican lead is Republican-skewed, that factor also has to be taken into consideration. Right now, it is clear that Arizona is close, but also clear that Biden has a slight lead, and Arizona is, therefore, characterized as “Tilts Democratic.”

With Biden favored in all of the six key states, again, the key question here appears to be whether the election will turn into a landslide for Biden. Let’s now take a look at the four states that would be considered “Landslide Indicators” for Biden.

TEXAS (38 electoral votes)

There has been much Democratic exuberance in recent days about Texas, especially with the reports of heavy voting before election day. However, the overwhelming preponderance of polling, even in recent days, shows Trump maintaining a narrow but clear lead in the Lone Star State. It may be very close, possibly decided by 1% or 2%, but Trump is clearly ahead. There may be some post-election recriminations against Biden and charges that if he had spent more time and money in Texas that he could have won it, but it is vitally important to understand that Biden’s national strategy (which did not include a heavy push in Texas) was correct. Texas was always going to be a very heavy lift, and Biden’s prime directive was to nail down the three Rust Belt states that defeated Hillary Clinton in 2016. Heading into election day, he appears to have done that. Texas was never going to swing the election; it would only have been icing on the cake. At this point, Texas is narrowly, but clearly, “Leans Republican.”

OHIO (18 electoral votes)

Ohio is very close, but Biden in recent weeks has been ahead, even if only slightly, in all but the most partisan polls. I never thought very much of Biden’s chances in Ohio and never considered it a must-win state for him. It isn’t. He can certainly win without Ohio. But looking at the data, it is with surprising ease that I can characterize Ohio as “Tilts Democratic,” and I am only going with “tilts” rather than “leans” due to the closeness of the margins.

GEORGIA (16 electoral votes)

It is very, very clear that Georgia is extremely close. Of 28 polls taken since February, Trump has led 13, Biden has led 11, and there have been four ties. In the last eight polls, it has been 3-3-2. Very few of these polls have been conducted by blatantly partisan pollsters. Candidly, Georgia is a coin flip, and if I were going to characterize any state as a toss-up, that is where Georgia would land. However, if Biden truly is ahead nationally by more than 7% (and I believe, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that he is), then Georgia is fairly likely to flip. I am going to characterize Georgia as “Tilts Democratic.”

IOWA (6 electoral votes)

I will state categorically that the latest Des Moines Register poll, typically considered the “gold standard” of Iowa polling, was an outlier, and I have several reasons for this position that I won’t delve into here (except to say that its characterization of U.S. Rep. Abby Finkenauer trailing by 15% in District 1 was obviously very, very wrong; it is not a plausible result). But even if we completely throw that poll (Trump +7%) in the trash can, it is clear that several other quality pollsters show Trump very narrowly ahead in Iowa. It is a close call, but I consider Iowa “Tilts Republican.”

Now, let’s look briefly at some of the states that Hillary Clinton narrowly carried in 2016 and which Trump was hoping to contest. Trump has not led in Minnesota (10 electoral votes) in a single poll in the Real Clear Politics listing, dating back over a year. In Nevada, local political expert Jon Ralston has noted on Twitter that Democrats have built a 90,000-vote firewall in early voting and are clearly favored to win that state’s six electoral votes. Polling in Maine and New Hampshire, with four electoral votes each, has clearly shown Biden with wide margins. All four are characterized as “Likely Democratic.” Maine splits its electors, with two being given to the statewide winner and one each from the state’s two congressional districts. Maine-01 is “Safe Democratic.” Maine-02 appears, at this point, to be “Tilts Democratic.”

Additionally, I expect Biden to flip one electoral vote in Nebraska, which apportions its five electoral votes the same way Maine does. Nebraska-02 polling indicates that its single electoral vote should be considered “Likely Democratic,” with the state’s remaining four electoral votes “Safe Republican.”

The only other state that I do not feel I can characterize as safe for either Biden or Trump is Alaska, where the small amount of polling done (two polls) has averaged a 4.5% lead for Trump. Out of an abundance of caution, I am characterizing Alaska’s three electoral votes as “Likely Republican.”

The remaining 35 states, and the District of Columbia, can be safely characterized as either Safe Democratic or Safe Republican.

Safely Democratic constituencies include: California (55), New York (29), Illinois (20), New Jersey (14), Virginia (13), Washington (12), Massachusetts (11), Maryland (10), Colorado (9), Connecticut (7), Oregon (7), New Mexico (5), Hawaii (4), Rhode Island (4), Delaware (3), Vermont (3), the District of Columbia (3), and, as mentioned previously, the single electoral vote in Maine-01.

Safely Republican states include: Indiana (11), Tennessee (11), Missouri (10), Alabama (9), South Carolina (9), Kentucky (8), Louisiana (8), Oklahoma (7), Arkansas (6), Kansas (6), Mississippi (6), Utah (6), Idaho (4), Nebraska (4), West Virginia (4), Montana (3), North Dakota (3), South Dakota (3), and Wyoming (3).

In all, the breakdown indicates a Biden win of 369-169 in the electoral college, with 210 of those electoral votes considered safe Democratic and 49 considered likely Democratic. Those states alone would get Biden to 259 of the 270 electors he needs to win. Biden would then need to win only one of Florida, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, or Arizona to get over the top.

Understand that a number of these states may not be formally called or projected by the networks on election night, due to the unusually heavy volume of mail-in ballots brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. But Florida could tell us a lot, because it does have experience with mail ballots and typically counts those quickly. Even if Biden does not cross the 270 threshold election night, he should be clearly on track for victory.

U.S. SENATE

Shifting to the Senate, it appears that Democrats are on track to make a net gain of three seats, with two seats in Georgia likely headed to a December runoff. This would give Democrats a 50-48 advantage pending the outcome of those Georgia runoff elections.

As I have expected all along, I think Democrats are clear favorites to flip Republican-held Senate seats in three states: Colorado, Arizona and Maine. In Colorado, I consider former Democratic governor John Hickenlooper a safe bet to unseat incumbent Republican Cory Gardner. In Arizona, I consider Democrat Mark Kelly a likely winner over incumbent Republican Martha McSally. And in Maine, I expect Democratic House Speaker Sara Gideon likely to defeat incumbent Republican Susan Collins.

I also think Democrat Cal Cunningham is clearly ahead of incumbent Republican Thom Tillis in North Carolina, and I rate that race “Leans Democratic.”

Conversely, former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville, a Republican, is a heavy favorite to defeat incumbent Democrat Doug Jones in Alabama, and I rate this race “Safe Republican.”

The closest race right now is in Iowa, where incumbent Republican Joni Ernst is locked in a tight battle with Democratic challenger Theresa Greenfield. If I were to characterize any Senate race as a tossup, it would be Iowa. However, recent polling (not just the clearly flawed Des Moines Register poll) makes it clear that the race has shifted back in Ernst’s direction, so I am calling Iowa “Tilts Republican.”

In Georgia, I think Democrats Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock will lead their races on election night, especially Warnock, who is running in a special election race with more than 20 candidates on the ballot. However, I would be surprised if either got to 50% in the final count, which means both races would go to a December runoff. History has shown that Democrats do not show up robustly in post-election runoffs, and so I am characterizing both races as “Runoff/Tilts Republican.”

Turning to other close races, I have never been bullish on the chances of five Democrats seeking Senate seats in strongly red states, and I remain skeptical that any of these five will win. I characterize Senate races in Alaska, Montana and South Carolina as “Lean Republican,” with Republican incumbents in all three states favored to win.

I consider Kansas, an open seat, to be “Likely Republican,” in part because of some past history in which a Senate race was polling closely there but ended up being a double-digit Republican victory. I simply don’t believe that the race in Kansas, which has not elected a Democrat to the U.S. Senate since 1932, is as close as the polling indicates.

And I have never moved Kentucky off of “Safe Republican” at any point in this election cycle. Democratic donors have wasted millions of dollars on the doomed candidacy of Amy McGrath, who has no chance whatsoever to defeat Majority Leader Mitch McConnell in this deep red state.

It is important to face reality, and here are the facts: Kentucky has not elected a non-incumbent Democrat to the U.S. Senate since 1972, or any Democrat at all to the Senate since 1992. The state has shifted heavily Republican in federal races since that time. Although Democrats often prevail in state-level races (such as the governorship), Kentucky is not alone in electing “out party” candidates to state-level races while steadfastly refusing to do so for federal-level races. (Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and Vermont are other current examples of this phenomenon). It would be surprising if this race is not called right away at 7 p.m. eastern on election night.

While Democrats have had a wide field on which to play, Republicans have had only other pickup opportunity aside from Alabama. That slight opening was in Michigan, and even that has never been better than an outside shot. It is clear that Democratic incumbent Gary Peters, whose small polling leads and poor fundraising had given hope to Republican challenger John James, is now pulling away, and I rate this race “Likely Democratic.”

Therefore, my expectation is that the final composition of the U.S. Senate will end up at 50-50, with Vice President Kamala Harris spending the next two years breaking tie votes. For those who do not understand how a landslide presidential victory can only produce a 50-50 tie in the Senate, understand that netting three seats is a pretty solid victory, and that the Senate, due to each state having equal representation, provides an artificial boost to the Republican Party. With heavily populated blue states like California each getting only two senators, the same as lightly populated red states like Wyoming, it is very difficult for Democrats to make big gains in the Senate.

U.S. HOUSE

Finally, shifting to the U.S. House, I believe that most prognosticators, as they did in 2018, are underestimating Democratic gains. Democrats won most of the seats that were available to them in their “Blue Wave” 40-seat pickup in 2018, but they left about 20 on the table that they lost by five points or less. After analyzing all the races and taking a look, particularly, at the Republicans who survived in suburban districts two years ago, I have come to the estimate of a +16 gain for Democrats this election, stretching their margin in the House to 248-187.

BOTTOM LINE

The end result would be a Democratic “trifecta,” meaning control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress. However, with only a 50-50 tie in the Senate, it would take just one Democratic senator (like West Virginia’s Joe Manchin, for example) to defeat Democratic legislation. As a result, progressive wish-list items such as ending the filibuster, expanding the Supreme Court and enacting sweeping health care reforms are all extremely unlikely to pass. This likely means continued dejection and disappointment on the Democrats’ far left, and possibly very big midterm losses in 2022. Whatever Democrats want to get done, they’d better get it done over the next two years.

FOOTNOTE: HISTORICAL ERROR RATE

Dating back to 2006, when I first began projecting the final outcomes of Congressional elections, my average miss on the final composition of the U.S. Senate has been 1.6 seats, and in the U.S. House, it has been 4.3 seats. If I remain within that range this election (not rounding up), the Senate could end up with anywhere from a 51-49 Republican majority to a 51-49 Democratic majority. Democrats could be expected to finish anywhere from +12 to +20 in the House, based on my past error rate.

No Election Night Guide This Year

by Cliston Brown | Oct 25, 2020 | Election Analysis

In my last preview of the upcoming election, I wrote that I intended to publish a comprehensive Election Night Guide, as I typically do for most presidential elections. Unfortunately, due to a crush of both personal and professional commitments for the next week, some of which were unexpected, I am not going to have enough time to finish compiling the guide.

I will still publish a final overview of the election on the morning of Monday, November 2. While it will not go into the depth that my Election Night Guide traditionally has, it will still identify the key races to watch in terms of the presidential election and control of the U.S. Senate. Control of the U.S. House of Representatives appears to be a foregone conclusion at this point, so I will not focus on individual races.

For the presidential race, it has become apparent that the pivotal state, and likeliest tipping point, is Pennsylvania. It is the one state that I view as being crucial to both candidates, and one that neither candidate can probably win without. For control of the Senate, the likeliest tipping-point states are North Carolina and Iowa.

30 Days Out: Race Shifts Back To Biden, Senate Democrats

by Cliston Brown | Oct 4, 2020 | Election Analysis

In the last two days, the revelation that Donald Trump had contracted COVID-19, and has been hospitalized as a result, has roiled the presidential race, but at this point, there seems to be no reason to expect that it will make a material difference. It is clear that the trajectory of the race has shifted back to Joe Biden. Readers may recall that in my last update, 30 days ago, I struck an ominous tone about the trajectory of the presidential race for Biden. Democrats will find my new update more heartening.

It is clear, from an examination of the polling trends in the key states, that Biden’s course has stabilized and has actually moved back in his direction. He maintains a lead in most of the key states and is, in fact, in better condition in some unexpected states than I expected he would be at this time.

A trend is emerging in which Biden’s position, relative to the position of Hillary Clinton four years ago, is improving among white voters in Midwestern states, but not improving significantly among their counterparts in southern states. It seems clear that white voters in the Midwestern and northeastern battlegrounds are much more “elastic” than white voters in southern states, who remain much more difficult to budge out of the Republican column.

The trends now clearly point to the first major shakeup in my view of the state of the race, as I am cautiously shifting Ohio to “Tilts Democratic.” Polling data clearly points to a race in the Buckeye State that has shifted in Biden’s direction, with Biden leading 10 of the last 12 polls since July. That said, his leads are very small—but consistent.

I am also moving Iowa at this time to “Tilts Democratic,” even though Trump’s polling position has been better in Iowa than in Ohio. It appears the trend is moving against him, with Biden recently moving into a small polling lead, and Biden’s improving position among Midwestern white voters and older voters augurs well for him in Iowa.

It is also clear that Michigan and Wisconsin can be moved back to “Leans Democratic,” although Michigan polling still appears softer for Biden than I expected it would. That bears watching. I also am moving the race in Nebraska’s District 2 back to “Leans Democratic,” and Biden appears to be in a very strong position to win that single electoral vote in Nebraska.

I remain convinced, as I have for months, that Pennsylvania is a harder lift for Biden than either Michigan or Wisconsin, and polling data is now bearing that out. I am keeping Pennsylvania at “Tilts Democratic,” as it is clear that Trump’s team is putting a lot of marbles in Pennsylvania. However, some recent polling in Pennsylvania has been very favorable for Biden, and the state appears likelier to move toward “Leans Democratic” than “Tilts Republican.”

I am also keeping Florida at “Tilts Republican,” despite a narrow polling lead for Biden. All signs I am seeing point to Democrats completely misplaying their hand with the state’s non-Cuban Latino communities. I have been in contact recently with a well-placed source in south Florida Democratic politics who indicates to me that the Democratic failure to engage these communities is even worse than I imagined. Make no mistake: with Biden’s improved position among white voters and seniors, he should be well ahead in Florida right now, by at least two or three points on average. The fact that he isn’t should be concerning to Florida Democrats.

I am also keeping North Carolina at “Tilts Republican,” because I find it hard to imagine that North Carolina will flip blue while Florida stays red.

But I am moving South Carolina to “Leans Republican,” based on a continued trend toward stronger-than-expected showings by Biden in that state’s polling. That, coupled with a very strong race by Democratic Senate candidate Jaime Harrison, convinces me that something unexpected is going on in the Palmetto State, and it bears watching.

At this point, it is clear that Biden’s position in Minnesota and Maine is strong, and I am moving Minnesota back to “Likely Democratic,” and three of Maine’s four electoral votes to “Safe Democratic.” I am also shifting the electoral vote in Maine’s Congressional District 2 to “Tilts Democratic.” Polling in Maine is now very strong for Biden, and it is hard to imagine him winning the entire state by double digits while losing the 2^nd District. The same trends that are benefitting Biden in Ohio and Iowa—improved performance among white voters and older voters—will also benefit him in northern Maine.

The ratings changes now show states that fall into the safe, likely or leaning Democratic categories have a total 270 electoral votes, exactly the number required for Biden to win. If all the states listed as “Tilts Democratic” also go to Biden, he would win the electoral vote by a count of 315-223.

U.S. Senate 

One of the dumbest things a person can do when his theories are cast into doubt is to double down and ignore all evidence to the contrary.

It has long been my contention that it is unlikely that any given state will vote for one party’s presidential candidate and another party’s candidate for Senate this fall. I still consider it unlikely. However, weeks of consistent polling data have made it clear that Democratic Senate candidates in Iowa, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina and South Carolina are clearly running ahead of Joe Biden in those states. While I still expect Republicans will win most or all of those races, it would be stupid to rule out the possibility of a split result in any of them.

In the last 20 years, the results of Senate and presidential races, when both are contested in the same year, have shown almost an 85 percent correlation. The correlation is even more stark when an incumbent senator is on the ballot and a presidential candidate of his or her party wins the state. There has been only one exception since 2000, and that exception occurred with the incumbent senator (Ted Stevens, R-Alaska) under indictment.

This is why I have been hesitant to give much of a chance to Democrats Steve Bullock of Montana or Jaime Harrison of South Carolina. Both are running against incumbent Republican senators in states that Donald Trump is likely to win. In the end, unless Trump faces surprisingly close races in those states, I still expect both Democrats will lose. But it would be foolish to deny that they are competitive and may have a realistic chance to win.

I have also been hesitant to give much of a chance to Democrat Barbara Bollier in Kansas. Although Bollier is not running against an incumbent, she is running in one of the most safely Republican states in America—one which hasn’t elected a Democrat to the United States Senate since 1932, and one which has not voted Democratic in a statewide federal race since 1964. In the end, I also expect she will likely lose, but again, it would be foolish to deny that she is close enough to have a puncher’s chance at an upset. That said, I’ve been fooled by Kansas before. In 2014, I bought into the polling that showed independent Greg Orman beating incumbent Republican Senator Pat Roberts. In the end, Roberts won comfortably, which has rendered me exceedingly cautious about overstating Democratic prospects in Kansas.

I am moving all three of these races to “Leans Republican,” but at this time, I still expect Republicans to win them all.

I still remain convinced that Democrats, in the end, will probably lose both Senate races in Georgia, with both likely headed for runoffs in December. Given a historical pattern of Democratic turnout drop-off for post-election runoffs, the dynamics favor the Republicans in both races.

Right now, the likeliest state for a split result split appears to be North Carolina, where Democratic Senate candidate Cal Cunningham is clearly running ahead of Biden in his race against Republican Senator Thom Tillis. That said, unlike in Iowa, Biden also maintains a razor-thin polling lead in North Carolina, so it may happen that both Democrats prevail in the Tar Heel State. That said, the recent revelations of romantically charged texts between Cunningham, who is married, and a married California political consultant, may change the trajectory of this race. At this time, out of an abundance of caution, I am moving this race to “Tilts Democratic.”

The next likeliest state for a split result appears to be Iowa, where Democratic Senate candidate Theresa Greenfield has established a small, but consistent, lead over Republican Senator Joni Ernst, but Biden is in a very tight race with Trump. I am moving this race to “Leans Democratic,” but I also have Iowa now going narrowly to Biden as well, so there may not be a split result here after all.

A split is also possible in Alaska, where independent candidate Al Gross won the Democratic primary and is polling very strongly against incumbent Republican Senator Dan Sullivan. Biden is also polling surprisingly well in Alaska; as in South Carolina, there may be something interesting happening there worth watching as well. I am now moving this race to “Tilts Republican.” Keep an eye on this one.

In addition to characterizing Iowa and North Carolina as “Tilts Democratic,” I continue to rate Colorado as “Safe Democratic,” while setting Senate races in Arizona and Maine as “Leans Democratic.” If Democrats prevail in these five races, while losing their seat in Alabama, as expected, they will finish with a 51-49 majority in the Senate.

U.S. House

I will not get into an exhaustive race-by-race breakdown here. There are always some House races on both sides that go an unexpected direction. Most people were taken completely off guard by Kendra Horn winning a seat in Oklahoma in 2018. That seat was on my list of potential surprises, given the fact that it was the kind of urban/suburban district that had been trending blue since Trump won in 2016. It is the same kind of seat, in locales across the country, where I expect Democrats will add to their House majority in 2020.

After 2018, my assessment of the results was that there were about 20 Republican-held seats in suburban districts that Democrats narrowly missed picking up in their 40-seat wave. Two of those seats have gone back to the Republicans as the result of a special election loss (California 25) and a party switch (New Jersey 2), but I expect them both to flip again, back to the Democrats, in 30 days.

This year, I think Democrats have a top-out number of +21. I don’t think they will top out; it is probably more realistic to expect that they will net about half of what they left on the table in 2016, roughly 10 seats. Using those two numbers as a range, my best estimation at this time is that Democrats will make a net gain of 16 U.S. House seats, which would give them a 249-186 advantage. This figure would approach the crushing 257-178 majority Democrats held in the House after the 2008 elections. However, with no filibuster available in the House, as there is in the Senate, and a continued trend toward partisan polarization, the margin in the House does not matter nearly as much as it once did.

However, these expected Democratic gains would not change the balance of power in state delegations, where Republicans would continue to control the delegations of at least 26 states. In the event that disputed results in one or more states send the presidential election to the House of Representatives, Trump would still likely have the edge, despite Democrats controlling more seats, because a House vote for president provides that each state, not each representative, would have one vote.

Final Update and Election Night Guide

I will issue a final update on the election on the morning of Monday, November 2, and I plan to publish a comprehensive election night guide on my website at that time. The quadrennial Cliston Brown Election Night Guide will provide a rundown on the presidential race and key House and Senate races in every state, listed by poll closing times, so that viewers can have a sense of what to be watching for as the returns come in.

60 Days Out: Biden Still Ahead, But Race Is Fluid; GOP Now Favored To Hold Senate

by Cliston Brown | Sep 4, 2020 | Election Analysis

It was around this time four years ago that I began to observe that the position of Hillary Clinton relative to Donald Trump in the Electoral College was slipping. At the time, I did not assign enough importance to this development, assuming that her continued polling lead was the key point to consider in forecasting the ultimate outcome of the race. I thought she was far enough ahead that some slippage would not matter. Like most election forecasters, I was wrong.

After Trump pulled out his upset victory, I began considering why I and so many others missed what was happening. In my case, I identified three considerations that I missed and resolved not to miss again.

1. Events matter. It became clear, based on exit polling of late deciders in 2016, that the James Comey announcement, late in the race, that he was reopening the FBI investigation into Clinton, moved late deciders heavily in the direction of Trump, clearly flipping Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin out of the Clinton column and into Trump’s.
   
2. All polls matter. I was too dismissive of polling that came from Republican outlets, which clearly showed movement in Trump’s direction in key states, particularly Florida and North Carolina, in the final days of the race, and I left such polling out of the state-by-state polling averages.
   
3. The trend matters. In past elections, the actual polling numbers have often been a lagging indicator, and it is the trend that gives us a better view of how the race is going. Two key examples: the elections of 1980 and 1948. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan were in a dead heat going into Election Day, but Reagan ended up winning in a blowout. In 1948, President Harry Truman trailed Thomas Dewey, but the trends had been moving in his direction for weeks, and Truman won by a surprisingly decisive margin.

In 2016, the polling trend was clearly moving against Clinton by this point in the race, so much so that I was revising her status downward in every swing state. I didn’t miss the trend, but I missed what it meant.

It is clear now that Biden has been suffering some slippage since my last forecast 40 days ago, with his national lead over Trump falling from 8.6% to 7.2%. While this is still a solid lead, the trend–particularly some concerning slippage (on average) in the battleground states–should be a matter of concern for the Biden campaign and his supporters.

In short, all three of the key areas of consideration that I missed in 2016 are showing movement in Trump’s favor. Events are moving in his favor as COVID is no longer a novelty and the public has, to some degree, gotten used to it; polling averages are moving in his favor; and polling trends are moving in his favor.

Several other factors are also concerning for Biden. A fourth factor in play is that Biden, according to virtually all available polling, is suffering slippage among Latino and Black voters relative to Clinton and certainly as compared to Barack Obama. This slippage could pose problems for him in states like Arizona, Nevada and even New Mexico if not reversed. Virginia may still be safe for Biden, even with slight slippage in its significant Black vote, due to its educational demographics; the same is true for Colorado, even with slight slippage for Biden among Latinos.

The fifth factor that poses a problem for Biden is that more people surveyed continue to view Trump as stronger on the economy than Biden would be, despite the economic turmoil that has racked the country due to the administration’s bungled COVID-19 response. As Democrats too often do, they are leaving it to the voters to connect the dots, which is a mistake. They seem to be banking on the idea that voters will independently deduce that Trump’s mismanagement of the pandemic response has been the cause of the economic downturn. While this may seem like an obvious fact to Democrats, the general public seems to be disconnecting the two issues. Democrats’ failure to make that connection for voters is reminiscent of the John Kerry campaign’s failure in 2004 to knock down the Swift Boat allegations that damaged his image as a war hero.

And there is a sixth factor that should be particularly concerning for Team Biden: his slowness to act. His failure to go to Kenosha swiftly after the police shooting of Jacob Blake and the ensuing riots was a colossal mistake, opening the door for Trump to capitalize on that mistake by going himself. As we have repeatedly seen over the last few decades, Democrats are consistently too passive and slow to act, while Republicans are consistently proactive and quick to seize opportunities that Democrats fumble. Biden finally went to Kenosha this week, but his flat-footedness is a matter of concern.

As a result of negative, or at least concerning, developments in these six areas, I am revising my ratings in 16 states in Trump’s direction. While I still rate Biden as the favorite, Team Biden needs to be thinking about playing to win rather than trying to run out the clock, and they especially need to be doing a better job with Latino voters.

I am, at this time, making the following ratings changes:

SAFE BIDEN to LIKELY BIDEN (5 electoral votes): New Mexico (5).
LIKELY BIDEN to LEAN BIDEN (38 electoral votes): Michigan (16), Minnesota (10), Nevada (6), New Hampshire (4), Maine-at-large (2).
LEAN BIDEN to TILT BIDEN (71 electoral votes): Florida (29), Pennsylvania (20), Arizona (11), Wisconsin (10), Nebraska-02 (1).
LEAN BIDEN to TILT TRUMP (15 electoral votes): North Carolina (15)
TILT BIDEN to LEAN TRUMP (16 electoral votes): Georgia (16).
TILT TRUMP to LEAN TRUMP (25 electoral votes): Ohio (18), Iowa (6), Maine-02 (1).
LEAN TRUMP to LIKELY TRUMP (38 electoral votes): Texas (38).
LIKELY TRUMP to SAFE TRUMP (9 electoral votes): South Carolina (9).

The upshot is that I now show Biden winning the Electoral College 319-219, down from my 350-188 projection 40 days ago, with North Carolina flipping to “Tilt Trump” and Georgia flipping to “Lean Trump.” But that is a very soft 319 for Biden, with only 210 electoral votes in the “safe” or “likely” category for him, and 270 needed to win.

In the U.S. Senate, I continue to maintain that it is highly unlikely that any state will produce a split result in which a presidential candidate of one party and a Senate candidate of the other party both win. At this time, I now expect Republicans to maintain their majority in the Senate by a bare 51-49 margin, with Democrats picking up seats in Arizona, Colorado, and Maine and losing a seat in Alabama.

With Biden’s fortunes clearly on the decline in North Carolina, and with the slippage of Democratic Senate candidate Cal Cunningham as well in recent polls, my expectation at this time is that the GOP will hang onto that Senate seat, unless the trajectory of the race turns back in the Democrats’ favor. I continue to maintain my view that Democrat Steve Bullock is not just an underdog in Montana, but a significant underdog. I also discount the chances of Democratic contenders in Kansas, Kentucky and South Carolina due to the fact that partisan polarization has created a very significant correlation between presidential and Senate results during presidential election years.

Additionally, I expect Democrats will make small gains in the House of Representatives. In 30 days, I will do a full analysis on the House.

The bottom line is that Democrats cannot expect to just run out the clock and win this election. Team Biden and the rest of the Democratic contenders need to be not just active, but proactive, and they need to both define Trump (rather than assuming that events will define Trump for them) and demonstrate that they will do better than Trump. Although some Democrats may consider it obvious that Biden will do better than Trump, they would do well to remember that nothing in politics should ever be considered obvious. You have to draw the voters a picture. If the Democrats don’t, the Republicans will.

100 Days Out: Biden Solidifies Role as Favorite; Democrats On Course To Win Senate Narrowly

by Cliston Brown | Jul 26, 2020 | Election Analysis

(Map courtesy of 270towin.com)

Today, July 26, we begin the home stretch of the 2020 election campaign. As of today, there are 100 days left until the November 3 elections. At this point in time, I am projecting that Democrat Joe Biden is now a clear favorite to defeat Republican Donald Trump, and that the Democrats are now favored to win control of the U.S. Senate.

In my last projections, 100 days ago, I was more circumspect on both counts. But the continued rolling disaster of the Trump Administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is looking more and more like Trump’s “Katrina event.” The difference is that the bungled response by George W. Bush to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina happened in his second term; politically, it only hurt his party in the 2006 and 2008 elections, not him personally. Trump has not been so lucky.

At this moment in time, Biden’s average polling lead is close to 9%, per Real Clear Politics. That puts him approximately 6.5% ahead of the 2.1% national popular vote margin posted by Hillary Clinton in 2016. While it is not necessarily a realistic view to assume a uniform shift, the state-by-state polling at this point does, in fact, reflect something very close to a uniform shift.

As a result, I am making the following ratings changes in the presidential race, all of which favor Biden:

GEORGIA (16 electoral votes) moves from Lean Trump to Tilt Biden.

FLORIDA (29 electoral votes), NORTH CAROLINA (15 electoral votes) and NEBRASKA-2 (1 electoral vote) move from Tilt Biden to Lean Biden.

MICHIGAN (16 electoral votes) moves from Lean Biden to Likely Biden.

OHIO (18 electoral votes), IOWA (6 electoral votes) and MAINE-2 (1 electoral vote) move from Lean Trump to Tilt Trump.

TEXAS (38 electoral votes) moves from Likely Trump to Lean Trump.

SOUTH CAROLINA (9 electoral votes) moves from Safe Trump to Likely Trump.

I am not as quick as some other commentators to move Indiana, Missouri, Kansas, Utah or Montana away from Safe Trump. I think that’s a stretch at this point. Demographically, nothing in any of these states indicates that they are likely to be in play for real in November. Despite the Johnson County suburbs moving away from Trump, he is still going to win rural Kansas by crushing margins. The same is true in Indiana and Missouri, where Trump is weak in suburban areas but disproportionately strong in rural areas. Utah’s potential to flip has been widely overstated as a result of a third-party candidate (Evan McMullin) shaving off much of Trump’s margin in that state in 2016.

I also remain hesitant to move Pennsylvania or Wisconsin from Lean Biden to Likely Biden, for much the same reasons that I am not moving states like Indiana, Missouri or Kansas out of the Safe Trump categorization at this time. Unlike most commentators, I think Wisconsin is likely to be a better state for Biden than Pennsylvania, and I would have moved Wisconsin to Likely Biden if not for the extremely draconian voter suppression laws that Wisconsin Republicans, both at the legislative and judicial levels, have put on the books in the last decade.

The reason why I consider Michigan and Wisconsin better turf for Biden than Pennsylvania is because Democratic losses in the first two states in 2016 clearly came down to turnout. If Detroit and Milwaukee had turned out at just slightly better rates in 2016, Clinton would have won both states. In fact, Trump won Wisconsin with fewer votes in 2016 than Mitt Romney got there in 2012, when he was losing the state by 7% to Barack Obama. A simple increase in Democratic turnout will solve any problems the party might have in Michigan and Wisconsin. In Pennsylvania, conversely, Clinton did well enough in the major cities to have won in any other year, but she got clobbered in the rural areas by unheard-of margins. Additionally, both Michigan and Wisconsin have consistently been to Pennsylvania’s left by at least a small margin for decades.

As of today, my projection is that Biden defeats Trump by a vote of 350-188 in the Electoral College, up from my previous 334-204 projection 100 days ago. The projected flip of Georgia from Lean Trump to Tilt Biden accounts for the change. But I also now believe Ohio, Iowa and Maine’s District 2 are all in play, which I did not believe in April. I still think flipping Texas is a bridge too far for Democrats this year.

Here are my current characterizations for all states:

SAFE BIDEN (210): California (55), New York (29), Illinois (20), New Jersey (14), Virginia (13), Washington (12), Massachusetts (11), Maryland (10), Colorado (9), Connecticut (7), Oregon (7), New Mexico (5), Hawaii (4), Rhode Island (4), Delaware (3), District of Columbia (3), Vermont (3), Maine-1 (1).

LIKELY BIDEN (38): Michigan (16), Minnesota (10), Nevada (6), New Hampshire (4), Maine-At-Large (2).

LEAN BIDEN (86): Florida (29), Pennsylvania (20), North Carolina (15), Arizona (11), Wisconsin (10), Nebraska-2 (1).

TILT BIDEN (16): Georgia (16).

TILT TRUMP (25): Ohio (18), Iowa (6), Maine-2 (1).

LEAN TRUMP (38): Texas (38).

LIKELY TRUMP (9): South Carolina (9).

SAFE TRUMP (116): Indiana (11), Tennessee (11), Missouri (10), Alabama (9), Kentucky (8), Louisiana (8), Oklahoma (7), Arkansas (6), Kansas (6), Mississippi (6), Utah (6), West Virginia (5), Idaho (4), Alaska (3), Montana (3), North Dakota (3), South Dakota (3), Wyoming (3), Nebraska-At-Large (2), Nebraska-1 (1), Nebraska-3 (1).

TOTAL BIDEN: 350
TOTAL TRUMP: 188

U.S. SENATE PREVIEW

(Map courtesy of 270towin.com)

Shifting to the U.S. Senate, I am taking the unusual step of moving a state into the “safe” category for a challenger taking on an incumbent. I do not see any way at this point that Senator Cory Gardner can win reelection in Colorado. I now rate Colorado as Safe Democratic and expect Democratic nominee John Hickenlooper to comfortably defeat the incumbent. This is more due to Colorado’s continuing leftward shift than anything having to do with Hickenlooper personally. By most accounts, he is not running a spectacular campaign. But he doesn’t need to.

In Georgia, I would be tempted to rate Democratic challenger Jon Ossoff a slight favorite over Republican Senator David Perdue, given Trump’s troubles in the state, and also to rate the Democrats as slight favorites in the special election for the seat currently held by appointed GOP Senator Kelly Loeffler. However, both Senate races in Georgia present unique challenges for the Democrats. The regularly scheduled election between Ossoff and Perdue includes two third-party candidates, and because Georgia requires a runoff in any race in which no candidate gets more than 50% of the vote, the likelihood of a close race going to a low-turnout runoff in January is high, and lower turnout will favor Perdue. The special election will certainly end in a runoff, but because there are more Democrats running than Republicans, the likelihood at this point appears high that Democrats will split their vote too many ways, enabling both Loeffler and fellow Republican Doug Collins to advance to the runoff. As a result, I continue to rate both races Lean Republican.

I still have just enough doubt about Arizona and Maine not to move those states. I still think Arizona is Likely Democratic, with Democrat Mark Kelly poised to defeat Republican Senator Martha McSally, and I still rate Maine as Lean Democratic, though I think Democratic nominee Sara Gideon is certainly favored to defeat Republican Senator Susan Collins. As long as Iowa remains “Tilt Trump,” I think incumbent Republican Senator Joni Ernst is also a slight favorite to win, but the prospects for neither Republican look as rosy as they did 100 days ago.

I am not as optimistic as many commentators are about the chances of Democrats Steve Bullock in Montana and Barbara Bollier in Kansas. In both states, Trump appears likely to win by large margins, and I find it doubtful that upwards of 15%-20% of Trump voters will vote for a Democrat for the Senate. The same is true in Kentucky, where Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is unpopular, but also highly unlikely to lose to Democrat Amy McGrath.

Bullock and McGrath face an additional obstacle that Bollier does not: they are running against incumbent Republicans. It is highly, highly unusual for a challenger to beat an incumbent senator in a year in which the incumbent senator’s presidential candidate wins the state. It has happened only twice in the last 20 years, and in both cases, there were special circumstances. In 2008, Democrat Mark Begich unseated Republican Senator Ted Stevens in Alaska, despite John McCain winning the state, because Stevens was under indictment at the time; Begich won by 1%.

Before that, it last occurred in 2000, when GOP Senator John Ashcroft lost narrowly in Missouri, despite George W. Bush winning the state. You may remember that was the famous race in which Ashcroft lost to Democrat Mel Carnahan, who had died in a plane crash just days before the election. Carnahan had been losing in most polling, but ended up winning posthumously after the Democratic governor promised to appoint his widow, Jean Carnahan, to the seat if the dead candidate won.

Neither the Montana nor Kentucky Senate races have any special circumstances this year. GOP Senator Steve Daines is not unpopular and there really seems to be no plausible reason why very many Trump voters would choose the Democrat Bullock over Daines. McConnell, on the other hand, is very unpopular, but Kentucky is such a heavily Republican state that it is impossible to imagine there will be very many Trump/McGrath voters. Besides, McConnell has always won despite never being especially well-liked in Kentucky, and that’s because Kentucky is a deeply conservative state. It may elect Democratic governors, but at the federal level, Kentucky hasn’t elected a Democrat in over 20 years, and voters clearly do make a distinction between state and federal races.

That said, the two-term governor Bullock is so well-liked in his state that I am shifting Montana from Safe Republican to Likely Republican. I am making the same rating change in South Carolina, where Democrat Jaime Harrison is running a credible race against Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, and where I think Trump’s support is softening a bit. Additionally, I also think Democrat M.J. Hegar is a good candidate in Texas, but I expect GOP Senator John Cornyn to run better than Trump in that state. To me, that means a rating of Likely Republican. I am making no ratings changes in Kansas or Kentucky, which remain Safe Republican.

As of now, I expect Democrats to defeat Republican incumbents in Colorado, Arizona, Maine and North Carolina, where Democrat Cal Cunningham continues to lead Republican Senator Thom Tillis. I characterize North Carolina as Lean Democratic. I also expect Republican Tommy Tuberville to defeat Democratic Senator Doug Jones in Alabama, and I rate this race Safe Republican (another rare instance in which I consider a challenger a safe bet against an incumbent). Jones won a special election under fluky circumstances, and while he will likely run well ahead of Biden in Alabama, it won’t be enough to keep him in office.

Iowa will be competitive, but right now, I still rate it as Tilt Republican. That could change between now and November, as could my rating in at least one of the two Georgia races.

Strangely enough, although Democratic prospects have improved over the last 100 days, I still, at this time, only expect Democrats to gain a 50-50 tie in the Senate, a net gain of three seats. If Biden does win, as I expect, his vice presidential candidate will be the tie-breaking vote in the Senate, giving Democrats procedural control of the chamber. However, if the present trends continue, there is a very real chance that Democrats could pick up seats in Iowa and Georgia as well. If there is a total Republican collapse, it is not out of the question that Democrats could end up with 52 or 53 seats in the Senate.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PREVIEW

As to the House of Representatives, I still have not sat down and done a comprehensive review at this time, but that is in part because I believe Republicans have no chance of retaking the chamber. Unlike most commentators, I do expect Democrats to make notable gains; they left a lot of suburban House seats on the table in 2018 by very small margins. I expect Democratic net gains in the House of somewhere from 12 to 15 seats. I will dig into this more deeply in future ratings.

The Myth of Ohio

by Cliston Brown | Apr 25, 2020 | Election Analysis

For decades, the notion that Ohio is a bellwether state that decides the outcome of this nation’s presidential elections has persisted. Even today, many Democrats cling to the notion that their party cannot win an Electoral College victory without claiming Ohio’s electoral votes.

This theory is bunk.

Ohio has gained its unearned reputation as an election-deciding bellwether largely due to sheer luck and the fact that its polls close at 7:30 Eastern time. As a result, it is perfectly positioned to be the state that appears to put the Democrats over the top in the Electoral College, but that is merely a function of Ohio usually being called sometime between 10 and 11 p.m. Eastern time, when one candidate or the other is within striking distance of hitting the magic 270 electoral vote threshold.

But Ohio has as much to do with electing presidents as crowing roosters have to do with causing the sun to rise.

In truth, Ohio has not played a decisive role in the election of any Democratic president since Woodrow Wilson narrowly won reelection in 1916. Even in that election, it was not the tipping-point state; the tipping-point state that decided the election was California. (A “tipping point state” is the closest state that gives the winning candidate an electoral college majority.)

It is an arithmetical fact that every Democrat who has won the presidency in the last 100 years would have won an Electoral College majority even if he had lost Ohio. Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy did just that, in 1944 and 1960 respectively.

In fact, Ohio has only been the decisive, tipping-point state in two presidential elections since the Civil War, and in both of those elections (1876 and 2004), Ohio tipped the election to a Republican.

An examination of Ohio’s electoral history demonstrates that Ohio is a Republican-leaning state that almost always votes a few points more Republican than the nation as a whole. Since the Republican Party’s founding in 1854, 41 presidential elections have taken place. Ohio has given Republican presidential candidates greater margins than the national electorate at large has in 33 of those 41 elections, slightly more than 80% of the time. In the 24 presidential elections held in the last century, the Republican margin in Ohio has exceeded the Republican margin in the national popular vote 21 times, exactly 87.5% of the time. In short, Ohio leans to the right of the nation in more than four out of every five presidential elections, and its Republican lean has only become more pronounced with time.

In the 41 elections conducted since the GOP was founded in 1854, Republicans have outperformed their national margin in Ohio by an average of 3.07%. In the last century, the average GOP margin in Ohio has grown to 4.185%. While there are some clear outliers in the data that skew the margin a bit, it is nonetheless clear that Ohio does lean to the right of the national average. In short, if a presidential election is dead-even, or the Democratic nominee wins the national popular vote by roughly a point or less, Ohio will go Republican.

Arithmetically, Democrats simply do not need to win Ohio to win the presidency. By the time Ohio falls into the Democratic column, the election has already been won in other states (even if their polls haven’t closed yet, or there hasn’t been enough of a count in those states to call them for the Democrat by the time that Ohio, an early-closing state, has been largely tabulated).

The implications are simple: Ohio should only be contested if Democrats have plenty of money to spend in other, more crucial states. History conclusively demonstrates that Ohio has never been the tipping-point state in a Democratic victory. To the degree that it ever has been a tipping-point state, it has tipped the election to the Republicans both times.

This is not to suggest that Democrats should give up entirely on Ohio. As long as its major cities provide a treasure trove of votes to the Democratic Party, there will always be a chance to win it, even if that chance is less than 50/50. And just as history shows us that Democrats can win without Ohio (and have done so), history also shows us that Republicans must win Ohio to win the election. They’ve never won nationally without winning Ohio.

But in the later stages of a close presidential race in which tough decisions must be made about resources, Democrats should pull the plug on Ohio without a moment’s hesitation and turn their focus to more fertile ground. Because to put it bluntly: If Democrats find themselves counting on Ohio to win an election, they’re going to lose.

200 Days Out: Biden A Slight Favorite; Democrats Poised to Flip Senate Narrowly

by Cliston Brown | Apr 17, 2020 | Election Analysis

As of today, there are exactly 200 days until the November elections, and at this moment, my expectation is that former Vice President Joe Biden, the Democratic nominee, rates a slight favorite over Republican President Donald Trump.

Based in part on polling averages at this time, and in part on the fundamentals of the race, I currently expect Biden to win 334 electoral votes, compared to 204 for Trump. I refuse to classify any state as a toss-up, which in my mind is a cop-out, but if I were going to list any states as “toss-ups,” those states would be Florida and North Carolina, which I currently list as “tilt Biden.” 

From a polling perspective, Biden currently has an average lead of about 5.5 percentage points, which is roughly 3.4 points above and beyond Hillary Clinton’s popular-vote margin over Trump in 2016. Adding 3.4 points to her totals across the board would flip Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin narrowly to Biden, and would turn North Carolina and Arizona into pure toss-ups. I am rating the latter two states as “tilt Biden” for several reasons.

• First, I expect slightly fewer third-party defections nationally in 2020 as compared to 2016, which to me indicates a probable bump of at least a few tenths of a percentage point for Biden.
• Second, there are key Senate races in both states:
  • In Arizona, Democrat Mark Kelly appears to be a clear favorite in his race against incumbent Republican appointee Martha McSally. Given the partisan polarization of the country at this time, I find it hard to imagine there will be very many Kelly voters who will also vote for Trump.
  • In North Carolina, Democrat Cal Cunningham, who is challenging Republican incumbent Thom Tillis for a Senate seat, is remarkably well funded.

I am rating Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin as “lean Biden” because adding 3.4 points to the Democrats in those states, compared to 2016, and also expecting fewer third-party defections, would flip those states by close but relatively comfortable margins. However, Michigan appears to be much more solid to flip back to blue than the other two, and Wisconsin much less so. I nearly put Wisconsin in the “tilt Biden” category, but was convinced to move it to “lean Biden” by the landslide win by the Democratic candidate in last week’s Wisconsin Supreme Court race, despite the obstacles of voting during a pandemic. It appears clear that there is a motivated Democratic electorate in Wisconsin this year. I also considered putting Pennsylvania in the “tilt Biden” category, but moved it to “lean Biden” based on his long history in the state.

Although the margin in Florida was not significantly greater for Trump in 2016 than it was in Pennsylvania, Michigan or Wisconsin, I am rating Florida “tilt Biden” right now, rather than “lean Biden,” for several reasons:

• First, there is a lot of unpredictability about how its numerous Latino communities will vote. For example: will Venezuelan-Floridians see Democrats as the party of socialism, as many Cuban-Floridians have for generations?
• Second, Republicans typically overperform in Florida relative to polling. I typically assume Republicans will do 2 percentage points better than expected in that state.
• Third, as is the case in most southern states, third parties typically do not do as well there as they do in other parts of the country; third-party defections were less of a factor in Florida to begin with, so Democrats should not expect as significant of a boost from a reduction in “spoiler votes” in Florida as they might in the Rust Belt states.
• Fourth, Trump’s approval ratings in Florida have been notably better than in many other swing states. So I have significantly less certainty about Biden being a favorite in Florida than I have about him being a slight but solid favorite in the three key Rust Belt states that I am rating “lean Biden” at this time.

In addition to Florida, North Carolina and Arizona, I also rate the 2^nd District of Nebraska as “tilt Biden.” It is slightly less Democratic-leaning, on the whole, than the three Rust Belt states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. But it is also the kind of urban/suburban area where Trump is not especially popular, and at this point, I would rate Biden a very slight favorite to win it.

In the “lean Trump” category, I include Ohio, Georgia, Iowa and the 2^nd District of Maine. A 3.4-percentage point increase in the Democratic totals would not budge any of these jurisdictions out of the Trump column. In fact, a case could be made that Ohio, Iowa and Maine’s 2^nd District should be rated “likely Trump.” However, there tends to be a greater tendency toward sharp swings in the Midwest than in other parts of the country, so it is not inconceivable that Biden could compete in either state. The 2^nd District of Maine is not only demographically similar to Iowa and rural Ohio, but also prone to large swings.

Understand that I consider the “lean Trump” states to be much more likely to go as I expect than any of the “lean Biden” states are. I think Trump is in a stronger position in Ohio, Georgia, Iowa or Maine’s 2^nd District than Biden is in Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan or Wisconsin.

Moving on to the states rated in the likely category, as a rule, I rated any state that voted for Clinton in 2016 as no worse than “likely Biden.” The states Clinton won by three points or less (Minnesota, Nevada, Maine and New Hampshire) all fall into this category. I expect all of them to be off the board unless there is some sort of significant shift toward Trump nationally, which I do not foresee at this time.

I continue to rate Texas as likely Trump. Despite the ongoing exuberance of many Democrats about Texas, it is too soon to expect Texas to flip in 2020. It may get closer than its nine-point Trump margin in 2016, but not close enough to truly be in play at this time. I expect Biden would need to win nationally by double digits to flip Texas, and I don’t consider that outcome likely.

The remaining states I classify as either “safe Biden” or “safe Trump,” and I doubt very many of those classifications would be considered controversial. I will discuss two of those: Virginia and Colorado, which I rate “safe Biden.” These two states have been consistently moving leftward for a generation, and their demographics (highly urban/suburban, highly educated) do not favor Trump or the Republican Party.

Also rated “safe Biden” are the District of Columbia and the following states: California, New York, Illinois, Washington, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, Oregon, New Mexico, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Delaware and Vermont.

Rated “safe Trump” are Indiana, Tennessee, Missouri, Alabama, South Carolina, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, Utah, Nebraska, West Virginia, Idaho, Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming.

The breakdown, as I see it today, is as follows:

BIDEN 334

• Safe Biden 210
• Likely Biden 22
• Lean Biden 46
• Tilt Biden 56

TRUMP 204

• Safe Trump 125
• Likely Trump 38
• Lean Trump 41
• Tilt Trump 0

Moving on to the Senate races, I will state that as a rule of thumb, I do not consider any state likely to vote for a presidential candidate of one party and a Senate candidate of the other party. The correlation between presidential vote and Senate vote over the four presidential elections conducted in the 21^st century is around 85%, and in the last presidential election, the same party won the presidential and Senate races in each state which had both races on the ballot.

As a result, at this time, I expect the Democrats to make a net gain of three seats in the Senate, flipping four seats from red to blue and losing the Alabama seat currently held by Democratic Senator Doug Jones. If Biden does, in fact, win the presidency, a +3 Democratic pickup will shift the Senate to Democratic control, with the Democratic vice president breaking the resulting 50-50 tie.

Earlier, I mentioned Democrats Mark Kelly of Arizona and Cal Cunningham of North Carolina as being especially strong candidates, and these are two of the seats I currently expect Democrats to flip. I’m currently rating North Carolina as “tilt Democratic” I also expect Democrat Sara Gideon to defeat incumbent Republican Susan Collins in Maine. In addition to Maine being a likely Biden state, which bodes well for Gideon, Collins’s approval ratings have plummeted as her veneer of supposed moderate has worn off. I currently rate the Arizona and Maine races as “lean Democratic.”

The fourth expected Democratic pickup is also the likeliest one, with Republican Senator Cory Gardner expected to lose in Colorado. As I noted earlier, Colorado is persistently moving left, and the demographics in that state bode poorly for the GOP. Gardner only won his seat narrowly in 2004, running against a Democratic incumbent who ran a poor campaign in a disastrous year for Democrats. Colorado’s continuing leftward shift since then has put Gardner in a decidedly bad position, and I rate Colorado as “likely Democratic.”

Very few other Senate races would not be considered safe at this time for one party or the other. On the Democratic side, I’m rating incumbent Democratic Michigan Senator Gary Peters’ race as “likely Democratic.” On the Republican side, I still rate races in Texas, Montana and Georgia involving GOP incumbents as “likely Republican,” despite the decision by popular Democratic Gov. Steve Bullock to run for the Senate seat in Montana. It is hard to see even a popular Democrat knocking off an incumbent Republican Senator (Steve Daines) while Trump is winning at the top of the ballot in Montana by a wide margin.

I rate two GOP-held seats as “lean Republican,” including Iowa and the seat up for a special election in Georgia. These ratings are the same as the presidential ratings in those states and I expect they will continue to correlate. If either Iowa or Georgia appears to be moving blue at the presidential level, I will adjust the Senate ratings in those states as well.

I am not issuing any House ratings at this time, as that landscape will require further study, but I also consider the House outcome to be in less doubt than the outcome of the presidential race or the composition of the Senate. Unless Trump reverses his fortunes in the suburbs in a big way between now and November, the House is all but certain to remain in Democratic hands.

2018 Midterm Forecast: Democrats +43 in U.S. House; No Net Change in Senate

by Cliston Brown | Nov 5, 2018 | Election Analysis

As I sit down to make my final estimates about the 2018 midterm elections, I have no small sense of trepidation. The last time I attempted to forecast an election, I got it badly wrong. My failure to see what, in retrospect, I feel I should have seen coming in 2016 has made me consider whether my own partisan preferences and/or overconfidence in my own acumen blinded me to the fundamentals of that election.

I resolved after that election to go back to basics, to pay less attention to polls and to do what I have typically done best: to focus on the fundamentals and what I know about the socio-political makeup of each Congressional district and each state.

There are two key fundamentals I have been keeping in mind over the two years of the current cycle:

1. Fundamentally, midterms are always a referendum on the president, and typically, when a president is hovering well under 50% approval ratings, his party loses badly.
2. Special elections during a two-year cycle usually give a very solid indication how the next election will end up.

With that in mind, I think it is clear that Democrats will make major gains on Tuesday. I think it is extremely likely that they will win the U.S. House of Representatives, a large number of governorships currently held by Republicans, and a significant number of state legislative chambers. The U.S. Senate has always been an uphill climb for Democrats this cycle, simply because so many Democratic-held seats (26) and so few Republican-held seats (9) are on the ballot, providing minimal pickup opportunities for Democrats and putting Team Blue on defense all over the map.

So the easiest call of this cycle is that Republicans are likely to retain the U.S. Senate. I see Democratic pickups in Nevada and Arizona, and Republican pickups in North Dakota and Missouri. I will say that my confidence about Arizona and Missouri is slim: Arizona, fundamentally, is still a Republican state, and Missouri’s Democratic Senator, Claire McCaskill, has a history of surviving tough races. But I feel extremely confident about the outcomes in Nevada and North Dakota. I expect when the votes are in, the makeup of the Senate will remain 51 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and two independent Senators aligned with the Democrats.

This means that I expect several endangered Democratic Senators will hold on, including Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.); Jon Tester (D-Mont.); Bill Nelson (D-Fla.); Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.); and Bob Menendez (D-N.J.). It looks like Nelson and Donnelly have opened a slight edge at the end. Democrats are sending out alarms about the troubled Menendez, but it is difficult to see how he loses when Democrats are poised to pick up 3-4 of the five Republican House seats in New Jersey (more on that later). I expect Democratic voters in New Jersey to hold their nose and vote for Menendez, if for no other reason than the Garden State’s disdain for Donald Trump.

In governorships, I expect Democrats to have a big night. It is a slam-dunk that they will flip governorships in Illinois, Michigan and New Mexico. After that, it is a question of who has momentum and enthusiasm. All the signs out of the Midwest is that Democrats will do well there Tuesday, so I expect governorships in Iowa, Ohio and Wisconsin to flip from red to blue as well.

Andrew Gillum, despite recent revelations that are causing his camp heartburn, has the momentum in Florida, and I expect him to prevail to become the first Democratic governor of Florida since 1998.

I expect the governorships of Maine and Nevada to flip, with slightly higher confidence about Nevada.

Now, on to the heavier lifts for Democrats. Republicans in Kansas are sounding alarms about their governor’s race, but the last time they were in peril (four years ago) in the gubernatorial and Senate races, they pulled it out by larger margins than expected. Of course, this isn’t 2014, but the presence of a third-party candidate in the governor’s race leads me to believe that the GOP will narrowly hold on. I also expect that South Dakota is too Trumpy a state to elect a Democratic governor for the first time since 1974, and that Oklahoma is too Trumpy to anoint a Democrat as well.

I also expect that Alaska will flip from independent to Republican, narrowly. Despite independent governor Bill Walker’s decision to drop out in favor of the Democrat, former Senator Mark Begich, Walker will still inevitably win a small percentage of the vote, and that should probably be enough to prevent Begich from winning.

In all, it adds up to a net gain of nine governorships for the Democrats, and a net loss of eight governorships for the Republicans, leaving the states split at 25-25. But watch the following states: the aforementioned Alaska, Kansas, Oklahoma and South Dakota, as well as New Hampshire. And if you want a real long-shot sleeper, keep an eye on Idaho, where Democrat Paulette Jordan appears to be an excellent candidate, but in a state that is very deep Republican red.

State legislatures are not given much attention in the horse race coverage, but based on the current trends and historical performance, I expect the following nine legislative chambers to flip from Republican control to Democratic, narrowing the Republican advantage in legislative chambers controlled from 66-33 to 57-42.

• Maine Senate
• New Hampshire House
• New Hampshire Senate
• Connecticut Senate (from tied to Democratic)
• New York Senate
• Wisconsin Senate
• Minnesota House
• Iowa Senate
• Colorado Senate

If these gubernatorial and legislative forecasts are correct, Democrats would go from full control of eight states to full control of 14 states; Republicans would go from full control of 26 states to full control of 21 states; and 15 states would have split control, as compared to 16 currently.

That brings us to the U.S. House of Representatives, which is the hardest body to forecast. It really comes down to whether one believes the Democrats will continue to overperform as they have in special and off-year elections since 2016, and how much Republican gerrymandering will blunt any wave. Working from east to west, here is where I see changes:

• New York: Democrats net 4 seats.
• New Jersey: Democrats net 4 seats.
• Pennsylvania: Democrats net 3 seats.
• Virginia: Democrats net 3 seats.
• North Carolina: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Florida: Democrats net 3 seats.
• Kentucky: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Ohio: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Michigan: Democrats net 4 seats.
• Illinois: Democrats net 2 seats.
• Iowa: Democrats net 2 seats.
• Kansas: Democrats net 2 seats.
• Texas: Democrats net 2 seats.
• New Mexico: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Colorado: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Arizona: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Utah: Democrats net 1 seat.
• Washington: Democrats net 2 seats.
• California: Democrats net 5 seats.

Going on the state-by-state, race-by-race calls, that puts Democrats at +43, giving them a 238-197 majority in the House.

However, keep in mind that this is an EXTREMELY conservative estimate. I have left a lot of potential Democratic pickups in the Republican column. If Tuesday night is really good for the Democrats, the number of gains could surpass 50. That said, one has to keep in mind the impact of Republican gerrymandering and the fact that even a wave leaves some survivors in the party on the wrong end of the wave. On the flip side, there are always some districts that surprise everybody. To wit: Don Young could lose in Alaska and somebody like Elise Stefanik could get taken out in New York. On the whole, I feel pretty comfortable predicting Democrats +43 in the House. A lot would have to go right for them on Tuesday to exceed that number.

My past results in Congressional elections, dating back to 2006, are within 1.5 seats in the Senate and 4.5 seats in the House. Using my own error margins, that could mean anything from a 51-49 Democratic majority to a 53-47 Republican majority in the Senate, and anything from a 233-202 Democratic House majority to 243-192.