Today, July 26, we begin the home stretch of the 2020 election campaign. As of today, there are 100 days left until the November 3 elections. At this point in time, I am projecting that Democrat Joe Biden is now a clear favorite to defeat Republican Donald Trump, and that the Democrats are now favored to win control of the U.S. Senate.
In my last projections, 100 days ago, I was more circumspect on both counts. But the continued rolling disaster of the Trump Administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is looking more and more like Trump’s “Katrina event.” The difference is that the bungled response by George W. Bush to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina happened in his second term; politically, it only hurt his party in the 2006 and 2008 elections, not him personally. Trump has not been so lucky.
At this moment in time, Biden’s average polling lead is close to 9%, per Real Clear Politics. That puts him approximately 6.5% ahead of the 2.1% national popular vote margin posted by Hillary Clinton in 2016. While it is not necessarily a realistic view to assume a uniform shift, the state-by-state polling at this point does, in fact, reflect something very close to a uniform shift.
As a result, I am making the following ratings changes in the presidential race, all of which favor Biden:
GEORGIA (16 electoral votes) moves from Lean Trump to Tilt Biden.
FLORIDA (29 electoral votes), NORTH CAROLINA (15 electoral votes) and NEBRASKA-2 (1 electoral vote) move from Tilt Biden to Lean Biden.
MICHIGAN (16 electoral votes) moves from Lean Biden to Likely Biden.
OHIO (18 electoral votes), IOWA (6 electoral votes) and MAINE-2 (1 electoral vote) move from Lean Trump to Tilt Trump.
TEXAS (38 electoral votes) moves from Likely Trump to Lean Trump.
SOUTH CAROLINA (9 electoral votes) moves from Safe Trump to Likely Trump.
I am not as quick as some other commentators to move Indiana, Missouri, Kansas, Utah or Montana away from Safe Trump. I think that’s a stretch at this point. Demographically, nothing in any of these states indicates that they are likely to be in play for real in November. Despite the Johnson County suburbs moving away from Trump, he is still going to win rural Kansas by crushing margins. The same is true in Indiana and Missouri, where Trump is weak in suburban areas but disproportionately strong in rural areas. Utah’s potential to flip has been widely overstated as a result of a third-party candidate (Evan McMullin) shaving off much of Trump’s margin in that state in 2016.
I also remain hesitant to move Pennsylvania or Wisconsin from Lean Biden to Likely Biden, for much the same reasons that I am not moving states like Indiana, Missouri or Kansas out of the Safe Trump categorization at this time. Unlike most commentators, I think Wisconsin is likely to be a better state for Biden than Pennsylvania, and I would have moved Wisconsin to Likely Biden if not for the extremely draconian voter suppression laws that Wisconsin Republicans, both at the legislative and judicial levels, have put on the books in the last decade.
The reason why I consider Michigan and Wisconsin better turf for Biden than Pennsylvania is because Democratic losses in the first two states in 2016 clearly came down to turnout. If Detroit and Milwaukee had turned out at just slightly better rates in 2016, Clinton would have won both states. In fact, Trump won Wisconsin with fewer votes in 2016 than Mitt Romney got there in 2012, when he was losing the state by 7% to Barack Obama. A simple increase in Democratic turnout will solve any problems the party might have in Michigan and Wisconsin. In Pennsylvania, conversely, Clinton did well enough in the major cities to have won in any other year, but she got clobbered in the rural areas by unheard-of margins. Additionally, both Michigan and Wisconsin have consistently been to Pennsylvania’s left by at least a small margin for decades.
As of today, my projection is that Biden defeats Trump by a vote of 350-188 in the Electoral College, up from my previous 334-204 projection 100 days ago. The projected flip of Georgia from Lean Trump to Tilt Biden accounts for the change. But I also now believe Ohio, Iowa and Maine’sDistrict 2 are all in play, which I did not believe in April. I still think flipping Texas is a bridge too far for Democrats this year.
Here are my current characterizations for all states:
SAFE BIDEN(210): California (55), New York (29), Illinois (20), New Jersey (14), Virginia (13), Washington (12), Massachusetts (11), Maryland (10), Colorado (9), Connecticut (7), Oregon (7), New Mexico (5), Hawaii (4), Rhode Island (4), Delaware (3), District of Columbia (3), Vermont (3), Maine-1 (1).
Shifting to the U.S. Senate, I am taking the unusual step of moving a state into the “safe” category for a challenger taking on an incumbent. I do not see any way at this point that Senator Cory Gardner can win reelection in Colorado. I now rate Colorado as Safe Democratic and expect Democratic nominee John Hickenlooper to comfortably defeat the incumbent. This is more due to Colorado’s continuing leftward shift than anything having to do with Hickenlooper personally. By most accounts, he is not running a spectacular campaign. But he doesn’t need to.
In Georgia, I would be tempted to rate Democratic challenger Jon Ossoff a slight favorite over Republican Senator David Perdue, given Trump’s troubles in the state, and also to rate the Democrats as slight favorites in the special election for the seat currently held by appointed GOP Senator KellyLoeffler. However, both Senate races in Georgia present unique challenges for the Democrats. The regularly scheduled election between Ossoff and Perdue includes two third-party candidates, and because Georgia requires a runoff in any race in which no candidate gets more than 50% of the vote, the likelihood of a close race going to a low-turnout runoff in January is high, and lower turnout will favor Perdue. The special election will certainly end in a runoff, but because there are more Democrats running than Republicans, the likelihood at this point appears high that Democrats will split their vote too many ways, enabling both Loeffler and fellow Republican Doug Collins to advance to the runoff. As a result, I continue to rate both races Lean Republican.
I still have just enough doubt about Arizona and Maine not to move those states. I still think Arizona is Likely Democratic, with Democrat Mark Kelly poised to defeat Republican Senator Martha McSally, and I still rate Maine as Lean Democratic, though I think Democratic nominee Sara Gideon is certainly favored to defeat Republican Senator Susan Collins. As long as Iowa remains “Tilt Trump,” I think incumbent Republican Senator Joni Ernst is also a slight favorite to win, but the prospects for neither Republican look as rosy as they did 100 days ago.
I am not as optimistic as many commentators are about the chances of Democrats Steve Bullock in Montana and Barbara Bollier in Kansas. In both states, Trump appears likely to win by large margins, and I find it doubtful that upwards of 15%-20% of Trump voters will vote for a Democrat for the Senate. The same is true in Kentucky, where Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is unpopular, but also highly unlikely to lose to Democrat Amy McGrath.
Bullock and McGrath face an additional obstacle that Bollier does not: they are running against incumbent Republicans. It is highly, highly unusual for a challenger to beat an incumbent senator in a year in which the incumbent senator’s presidential candidate wins the state. It has happened only twice in the last 20 years, and in both cases, there were special circumstances. In 2008, Democrat Mark Begich unseated Republican Senator Ted Stevens in Alaska, despite John McCain winning the state, because Stevens was under indictment at the time; Begich won by 1%.
Before that, it last occurred in 2000, when GOP Senator John Ashcroft lost narrowly in Missouri, despite George W. Bush winning the state. You may remember that was the famous race in which Ashcroft lost to Democrat Mel Carnahan, who had died in a plane crash just days before the election. Carnahan had been losing in most polling, but ended up winning posthumously after the Democratic governor promised to appoint his widow, Jean Carnahan, to the seat if the dead candidate won.
Neither the Montana nor Kentucky Senate races have any special circumstances this year. GOP Senator Steve Daines is not unpopular and there really seems to be no plausible reason why very many Trump voters would choose the Democrat Bullock over Daines. McConnell, on the other hand, is very unpopular, but Kentucky is such a heavily Republican state that it is impossible to imagine there will be very many Trump/McGrath voters. Besides, McConnell has always won despite never being especially well-liked in Kentucky, and that’s because Kentucky is a deeply conservative state. It may elect Democratic governors, but at the federal level, Kentucky hasn’t elected a Democrat in over 20 years, and voters clearly do make a distinction between state and federal races.
That said, the two-term governor Bullock is so well-liked in his state that I am shifting Montana from Safe Republican to Likely Republican. I am making the same rating change in South Carolina, where Democrat Jaime Harrison is running a credible race against Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, and where I think Trump’s support is softening a bit. Additionally, I also think Democrat M.J. Hegar is a good candidate in Texas, but I expect GOP Senator John Cornyn to run better than Trump in that state. To me, that means a rating of Likely Republican. I am making no ratings changes in Kansas or Kentucky, which remain Safe Republican.
As of now, I expect Democrats to defeat Republican incumbents in Colorado, Arizona, Maine and North Carolina, where Democrat Cal Cunningham continues to lead Republican Senator Thom Tillis. I characterize North Carolina as Lean Democratic. I also expect Republican Tommy Tuberville to defeat Democratic Senator Doug Jones in Alabama, and I rate this race Safe Republican (another rare instance in which I consider a challenger a safe bet against an incumbent). Jones won a special election under fluky circumstances, and while he will likely run well ahead of Biden in Alabama, it won’t be enough to keep him in office.
Iowa will be competitive, but right now, I still rate it as Tilt Republican. That could change between now and November, as could my rating in at least one of the two Georgia races.
Strangely enough, although Democratic prospects have improved over the last 100 days, I still, at this time, only expect Democrats to gain a 50-50 tie in the Senate, a net gain of three seats. If Biden does win, as I expect, his vice presidential candidate will be the tie-breaking vote in the Senate, giving Democrats procedural control of the chamber. However, if the present trends continue, there is a very real chance that Democrats could pick up seats in Iowa and Georgia as well. If there is a total Republican collapse, it is not out of the question that Democrats could end up with 52 or 53 seats in the Senate.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PREVIEW
As to the House of Representatives, I still have not sat down and done a comprehensive review at this time, but that is in part because I believe Republicans have no chance of retaking the chamber. Unlike most commentators, I do expect Democrats to make notable gains; they left a lot of suburban House seats on the table in 2018 by very small margins. I expect Democratic net gains in the House of somewhere from 12 to 15 seats. I will dig into this more deeply in future ratings.
Contrary to popular belief, the vice presidency is not a great ticket to the Oval Office. Only 29% of vice presidents have gotten there, and nearly two-thirds of those became president due to the previous president dying or resigning.
A vice president who doesn’t succeed to the presidency due to a death or resignation has about a 1-in-10 chance of actually getting there.
A popular notion on Twitter these days is that Joe Biden, should he win the presidency this fall, will only serve one term and, therefore, whoever he selects as his vice president will have the inside track on the Democratic nomination, and the presidency, in 2024.
We’ll set aside, for a moment, a discussion of the myth that running for the presidency as a sitting vice president gives anyone a leg up. (History shows that most sitting vice presidents don’t even get nominated for the presidency, much less win; only four ever have, and only one of those since 1836. But that’s another topic that I plan to cover as part of another post soon.)
Today’s post will focus on the widely circulated belief that Biden is running purely to get Trump out of office and, due to his advanced age, will not seek a second term if elected this November.
Well, sure. It’s possible. But it’s highly unlikely.
It must be said: we never know what is in a person’s mind unless they tell us. But Biden hasn’t made any such pledge, so his course of action in 2024, if elected in 2020, can only be guessed at. And there are a lot more reasons to guess that he will seek a second term than there are to expect that he won’t.
The truth is that it takes a certain kind of personality to run for president. It’s a huge job that requires an insane amount of striving to get. It also requires a pretty large ego–anybody who really thinks he or she is the best person to hold the most powerful job in the world must have an extremely high opinion of oneself. Anyone who makes it to the White House has generally has spent a significant part of his adult life building toward that moment. For whatever reason, they want the power and the prestige of the presidency, whether for altruistic reasons or for purely egotistical ones.
People who put so much time, and so much of their heart and soul, for so many years, into becoming president are not likely to step away from their lifelong dream voluntarily. It is no coincidence that so many rulers in other, less democratic countries end up staying on for life. Honestly, where do you go, and what do you do, after you have been the head of state of the most powerful country on earth? What can compare? Do you think Bill Clinton doesn’t wake up every day feeling a little bored and thinking wistfully about the job he once held? (Asked in the early 2000s if he would have sought a third term, had it been constitutional, Clinton responded candidly: “I’d have made y’all throw me out.”)
In America, it became customary for presidents to seek no more than two terms due to the example set by President George Washington. Ultimately, after Franklin Roosevelt broke with this tradition by successfully seeking a third term in 1940 (and a fourth in 1944), Congress and the states enacted the 22nd Amendment codifying the two-term limit into law–although it is instructive that Congress quite pointedly did not apply any term limits to itself. Congressmen like power and prestige, too. They might not mind limiting someone else’s terms, but they’ll gladly hang out in Washington for 40 years if they can, thank you very much.
Since the passage of the 22nd Amendment, only two presidents have voluntarily stepped aside while still eligible to run for reelection. Harry Truman, who was not covered by the amendment due to having already been in office when it passed, chose not to run in 1952. But Truman had already served almost two full terms, taking over the presidency just three months into Franklin Roosevelt’s fourth term in 1945 and then winning the presidency in his own right in 1948. Truman may have had the least ambition for the presidency of anyone who has sought the office in the last century, steadfastly resisting the offer of the vice presidency in 1944 until essentially commanded by Roosevelt to accept for the good of the Democratic Party. So perhaps he would have chosen to step aside in 1952 even if his approval ratings hadn’t sunk to 22%. We’ll never know–but remember, he had essentially already served two full terms, and with the Republican Party set to nominate General Dwight Eisenhower, Truman would have had to be remarkably optimistic–or stupid–to expect that he would win.
Lyndon Johnson, in his sixth year in the Oval Office, withdrew from the 1968 presidential race, claiming that the country needed him to focus on the Vietnam War rather than running another campaign. This self-serving statement of martyrdom by an intensely vain, power-hungry man who would have sold his own mother into slavery to be president doesn’t meet the smell test. Johnson was badly wounded by his support of the unpopular war in Vietnam, and shortly after an obscure anti-war senator won 42% against him in the New Hampshire primary–a shocking testament to his political vulnerability that showed the writing was on the wall–Johnson bowed out. But again, he had served about a term and a half.
You’d have to go all the way back to 1880 to find a president who voluntarily stepped away after only one term. That was Rutherford B. Hayes, a mediocre president who had been elected under the most divisive and frankly shady circumstances in the history of U.S. presidential elections. No president in the last 140 years has voluntarily chosen not to run for reelection after just four years in office.
And some presidents hung on to their offices even during severe health crises that made it impossible for them to do their jobs properly, or at all. For all the talk about how Biden will probably forego a second term if he has health issues, consider two examples of how presidents will hang on by their fingernails even during the worst health crises.
EXAMPLE 1: Franklin Roosevelt accepted renomination in 1944 even though he was clearly dying of acute congestive heart failure. He had been ordered by his physician not to work more than four hours a day–an extremely light work schedule for a president in the middle of a world war. His condition was so well-known by key insiders that party elders knew the 1944 Democratic convention was selecting two presidents, not one, as documented in the Truman biography by David McCullough.
One response to this observation is that FDR stayed on because the country needed continuity in wartime, but whether he had stood for reelection or not, it was likely that there would be a change in leadership one way or the other. This is, of course, exactly what happened, as FDR died 82 days into his fourth term, months before the war ended. Whether his doctors told him explicitly of his prognosis is not known, but surely Roosevelt knew his condition was grave, having had a type of seizure shortly before accepting his 1944 renomination by radio linkup.
EXAMPLE 2: President Woodrow Wilson, half his body paralyzed after a pair of strokes and an embolism, actively conspired with his wife Edith to deceive Congress and his own cabinet about the seriousness of his condition. After his devastating second stroke in September 1919, Edith Wilson took on the president’s duties while blocking access to the president to obscure his inability to do his job. His physician, Dr. Cary Grayson, blatantly lied, claiming after the first stroke that the president had taken ill with influenza. The country went on like this for the final 18 months of Wilson’s second term.
Ego-driven leaders who have risen to the height of power simply do not part with that power unless they absolutely have to–due to term limits, losing an election, or impending defeat in an upcoming election. Nobody can read Biden’s mind, or know what he would do if hit with a serious health crisis.
But those who are counting on him to serve only one term, and hoping their own preferred candidate will become the heir apparent in 2024, should learn from history that they shouldn’t count on it.
For decades, the notion that Ohio is a bellwether state that decides the outcome of this nation’s presidential elections has persisted. Even today, many Democrats cling to the notion that their party cannot win an Electoral College victory without claiming Ohio’s electoral votes.
This theory is bunk.
Ohio has gained its unearned reputation as an election-deciding bellwether largely due to sheer luck and the fact that its polls close at 7:30 Eastern time. As a result, it is perfectly positioned to be the state that appears to put the Democrats over the top in the Electoral College, but that is merely a function of Ohio usually being called sometime between 10 and 11 p.m. Eastern time, when one candidate or the other is within striking distance of hitting the magic 270 electoral vote threshold.
But Ohio has as much to do with electing presidents as crowing roosters have to do with causing the sun to rise.
In truth, Ohio has not played a decisive role in the election of any Democratic president since Woodrow Wilson narrowly won reelection in 1916. Even in that election, it was not the tipping-point state; the tipping-point state that decided the election was California. (A “tipping point state” is the closest state that gives the winning candidate an electoral college majority.)
It is an arithmetical fact that every Democrat who has won the presidency in the last 100 years would have won an Electoral College majority even if he had lost Ohio.Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy did just that, in 1944 and 1960 respectively.
In fact, Ohio has only been the decisive, tipping-point state in two presidential elections since the Civil War, and in both of those elections (1876 and 2004), Ohio tipped the election to a Republican.
An examination of Ohio’s electoral history demonstrates that Ohio is a Republican-leaning state that almost always votes a few points more Republican than the nation as a whole. Since the Republican Party’s founding in 1854, 41 presidential elections have taken place. Ohio has given Republican presidential candidates greater margins than the national electorate at large has in 33 of those 41 elections, slightly more than 80% of the time. In the 24 presidential elections held in the last century, the Republican margin in Ohio has exceeded the Republican margin in the national popular vote 21 times, exactly 87.5% of the time. In short, Ohio leans to the right of the nation in more than four out of every five presidential elections, and its Republican lean has only become more pronounced with time.
In the 41 elections conducted since the GOP was founded in 1854, Republicans have outperformed their national margin in Ohio by an average of 3.07%. In the last century, the average GOP margin in Ohio has grown to 4.185%. While there are some clear outliers in the data that skew the margin a bit, it is nonetheless clear that Ohio does lean to the right of the national average. In short, if a presidential election is dead-even, or the Democratic nominee wins the national popular vote by roughly a point or less, Ohio will go Republican.
Arithmetically, Democrats simply do not need to win Ohio to win the presidency. By the time Ohio falls into the Democratic column, the election has already been won in other states (even if their polls haven’t closed yet, or there hasn’t been enough of a count in those states to call them for the Democrat by the time that Ohio, an early-closing state, has been largely tabulated).
The implications are simple: Ohio should only be contested if Democrats have plenty of money to spend in other, more crucial states. History conclusively demonstrates that Ohio has never been the tipping-point state in a Democratic victory. To the degree that it ever has been a tipping-point state, it has tipped the election to the Republicans both times.
This is not to suggest that Democrats should give up entirely on Ohio. As long as its major cities provide a treasure trove of votes to the Democratic Party, there will always be a chance to win it, even if that chance is less than 50/50. And just as history shows us that Democrats can win without Ohio (and have done so), history also shows us that Republicans must win Ohio to win the election. They’ve never won nationally without winning Ohio.
But in the later stages of a close presidential race in which tough decisions must be made about resources, Democrats should pull the plug on Ohio without a moment’s hesitation and turn their focus to more fertile ground. Because to put it bluntly: If Democrats find themselves counting on Ohio to win an election, they’re going to lose.
As of today, there are exactly 200 days until the November elections, and at this moment, my expectation is that former Vice President Joe Biden, the Democratic nominee, rates a slight favorite over Republican President Donald Trump.
Based in part on polling averages at this time, and in part on the fundamentals of the race, I currently expect Biden to win 334 electoral votes, compared to 204 for Trump. I refuse to classify any state as a toss-up, which in my mind is a cop-out, but if I were going to list any states as “toss-ups,” those states would be Florida and North Carolina, which I currently list as “tilt Biden.”
From a polling perspective, Biden currently has an average lead of about 5.5 percentage points, which is roughly 3.4 points above and beyond Hillary Clinton’s popular-vote margin over Trump in 2016. Adding 3.4 points to her totals across the board would flip Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin narrowly to Biden, and would turn North Carolina and Arizona into pure toss-ups. I am rating the latter two states as “tilt Biden” for several reasons.
First, I expect slightly fewer third-party defections nationally in 2020 as compared to 2016, which to me indicates a probable bump of at least a few tenths of a percentage point for Biden.
Second, there are key Senate races in both states:
In Arizona, Democrat Mark Kelly appears to be a clear favorite in his race against incumbent Republican appointee Martha McSally. Given the partisan polarization of the country at this time, I find it hard to imagine there will be very many Kelly voters who will also vote for Trump.
In North Carolina, Democrat Cal Cunningham, who is challenging Republican incumbent Thom Tillis for a Senate seat, is remarkably well funded.
I am rating Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin as “lean Biden” because adding 3.4 points to the Democrats in those states, compared to 2016, and also expecting fewer third-party defections, would flip those states by close but relatively comfortable margins. However, Michigan appears to be much more solid to flip back to blue than the other two, and Wisconsin much less so. I nearly put Wisconsin in the “tilt Biden” category, but was convinced to move it to “lean Biden” by the landslide win by the Democratic candidate in last week’s Wisconsin Supreme Court race, despite the obstacles of voting during a pandemic. It appears clear that there is a motivated Democratic electorate in Wisconsin this year. I also considered putting Pennsylvania in the “tilt Biden” category, but moved it to “lean Biden” based on his long history in the state.
Although the margin in Florida was not significantly greater for Trump in 2016 than it was in Pennsylvania, Michigan or Wisconsin, I am rating Florida “tilt Biden” right now, rather than “lean Biden,” for several reasons:
First, there is a lot of unpredictability about how its numerous Latino communities will vote. For example: will Venezuelan-Floridians see Democrats as the party of socialism, as many Cuban-Floridians have for generations?
Second, Republicans typically overperform in Florida relative to polling. I typically assume Republicans will do 2 percentage points better than expected in that state.
Third, as is the case in most southern states, third parties typically do not do as well there as they do in other parts of the country; third-party defections were less of a factor in Florida to begin with, so Democrats should not expect as significant of a boost from a reduction in “spoiler votes” in Florida as they might in the Rust Belt states.
Fourth, Trump’s approval ratings in Florida have been notably better than in many other swing states. So I have significantly less certainty about Biden being a favorite in Florida than I have about him being a slight but solid favorite in the three key Rust Belt states that I am rating “lean Biden” at this time.
In addition to Florida, North Carolina and Arizona, I also rate the 2nd District of Nebraska as “tilt Biden.” It is slightly less Democratic-leaning, on the whole, than the three Rust Belt states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. But it is also the kind of urban/suburban area where Trump is not especially popular, and at this point, I would rate Biden a very slight favorite to win it.
In the “lean Trump” category, I include Ohio, Georgia, Iowa and the 2nd District of Maine. A 3.4-percentage point increase in the Democratic totals would not budge any of these jurisdictions out of the Trump column. In fact, a case could be made that Ohio, Iowa and Maine’s 2nd District should be rated “likely Trump.” However, there tends to be a greater tendency toward sharp swings in the Midwest than in other parts of the country, so it is not inconceivable that Biden could compete in either state. The 2nd District of Maine is not only demographically similar to Iowa and rural Ohio, but also prone to large swings.
Understand that I consider the “lean Trump” states to be much more likely to go as I expect than any of the “lean Biden” states are. I think Trump is in a stronger position in Ohio, Georgia, Iowa or Maine’s 2nd District than Biden is in Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan or Wisconsin.
Moving on to the states rated in the likely category, as a rule, I rated any state that voted for Clinton in 2016 as no worse than “likely Biden.” The states Clinton won by three points or less (Minnesota, Nevada, Maine and New Hampshire) all fall into this category. I expect all of them to be off the board unless there is some sort of significant shift toward Trump nationally, which I do not foresee at this time.
I continue to rate Texas as likely Trump. Despite the ongoing exuberance of many Democrats about Texas, it is too soon to expect Texas to flip in 2020. It may get closer than its nine-point Trump margin in 2016, but not close enough to truly be in play at this time. I expect Biden would need to win nationally by double digits to flip Texas, and I don’t consider that outcome likely.
The remaining states I classify as either “safe Biden” or “safe Trump,” and I doubt very many of those classifications would be considered controversial. I will discuss two of those: Virginia and Colorado, which I rate “safe Biden.” These two states have been consistently moving leftward for a generation, and their demographics (highly urban/suburban, highly educated) do not favor Trump or the Republican Party.
Also rated “safe Biden” are the District of Columbia and the following states: California, New York, Illinois, Washington, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, Oregon, New Mexico, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Delaware and Vermont.
Rated “safe Trump” are Indiana, Tennessee, Missouri, Alabama, South Carolina, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, Utah, Nebraska, West Virginia, Idaho, Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming.
The breakdown, as I see it today, is as follows:
BIDEN 334
Safe Biden 210
Likely Biden 22
Lean Biden 46
Tilt Biden 56
TRUMP 204
Safe Trump 125
Likely Trump 38
Lean Trump 41
Tilt Trump 0
Moving on to the Senate races, I will state that as a rule of thumb, I do not consider any state likely to vote for a presidential candidate of one party and a Senate candidate of the other party. The correlation between presidential vote and Senate vote over the four presidential elections conducted in the 21st century is around 85%, and in the last presidential election, the same party won the presidential and Senate races in each state which had both races on the ballot.
As a result, at this time, I expect the Democrats to make a net gain of three seats in the Senate, flipping four seats from red to blue and losing the Alabama seat currently held by Democratic Senator Doug Jones. If Biden does, in fact, win the presidency, a +3 Democratic pickup will shift the Senate to Democratic control, with the Democratic vice president breaking the resulting 50-50 tie.
Earlier, I mentioned Democrats Mark Kelly of Arizona and Cal Cunningham of North Carolina as being especially strong candidates, and these are two of the seats I currently expect Democrats to flip. I’m currently rating North Carolina as “tilt Democratic” I also expect Democrat Sara Gideon to defeat incumbent Republican Susan Collins in Maine. In addition to Maine being a likely Biden state, which bodes well for Gideon, Collins’s approval ratings have plummeted as her veneer of supposed moderate has worn off. I currently rate the Arizona and Maine races as “lean Democratic.”
The fourth expected Democratic pickup is also the likeliest one, with Republican Senator Cory Gardner expected to lose in Colorado. As I noted earlier, Colorado is persistently moving left, and the demographics in that state bode poorly for the GOP. Gardner only won his seat narrowly in 2004, running against a Democratic incumbent who ran a poor campaign in a disastrous year for Democrats. Colorado’s continuing leftward shift since then has put Gardner in a decidedly bad position, and I rate Colorado as “likely Democratic.”
Very few other Senate races would not be considered safe at this time for one party or the other. On the Democratic side, I’m rating incumbent Democratic Michigan Senator Gary Peters’ race as “likely Democratic.” On the Republican side, I still rate races in Texas, Montana and Georgia involving GOP incumbents as “likely Republican,” despite the decision by popular Democratic Gov. Steve Bullock to run for the Senate seat in Montana. It is hard to see even a popular Democrat knocking off an incumbent Republican Senator (Steve Daines) while Trump is winning at the top of the ballot in Montana by a wide margin.
I rate two GOP-held seats as “lean Republican,” including Iowa and the seat up for a special election in Georgia. These ratings are the same as the presidential ratings in those states and I expect they will continue to correlate. If either Iowa or Georgia appears to be moving blue at the presidential level, I will adjust the Senate ratings in those states as well.
I am not issuing any House ratings at this time, as that landscape will require further study, but I also consider the House outcome to be in less doubt than the outcome of the presidential race or the composition of the Senate. Unless Trump reverses his fortunes in the suburbs in a big way between now and November, the House is all but certain to remain in Democratic hands.
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