I became a Democrat as a college student in the 1990s, largely for three reasons, one practical, the other two ideological.
1) At that time, I harbored ambitions of running for office, and my home county and Congressional district were solidly Democratic. That was the practical reason.
2) I was appalled by the childish, petulant Republican reaction to the election of President Bill Clinton, of whom I was a staunch supporter. Their constant grumbling and whining about losing an election, to me, indicated an unwillingness to accept the verdict of the voters.
3) The Republicans opposed what was known as the Motor-Voter Bill, which allowed drivers’ licensing branches across the country to register people to vote. The point of the bill, which Clinton signed into law in 1993, was to get more eligible citizens registered to vote. I remember asking myself at the time “Why don’t Republicans want more people to vote?” I quickly concluded that the answer was evident in the question itself.
Many years later, I would write an article for the New York Observer on how polling showed non-voters tended to break heavily Democratic. The implication was clear: the more people who vote, the likelier that Democrats will win.
Therefore, it is clearly in Republicans’ interest to stifle the democratic process. If voting is easy, more people will do it, and Republicans will win fewer elections. The rash of restrictive voter-identification laws in Republican-controlled states, surgically precise gerrymandering that ensures Republicans win Congressional and legislative seats even if they win fewer votes statewide, targeted voter-roll purging, and chicanery such as shutting down or moving polling stations in heavily Democratic areas, are all intended to reduce the voting pool and help Republicans win.
In short, democracy itself works against Republicans, because Republican ideology and policy is unpopular with most of the public. Republicans have faced this conundrum for almost a hundred years, and for most of that time, they lost a lot more elections than they won.
By the 1960s, it was clear to Republicans that they were never going to win elections on the issues, so they needed to find other ways to win. This was the genesis of Richard Nixon’s infamous “Southern Strategy,” in which Republicans began getting around their unpopular positions on economic issues by appealing to the cultural grievances of disaffected white racists. As it turned out, these voters existed outside the South as well. They began leaving the Democratic Party after President Lyndon Johnson pushed through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Republicans rode them to victory in five of the next six presidential elections, control of Congress for most of the years after 1994, and control of most key swing states since the turn of the century. That enabled Republicans to begin redrawing the Congressional and legislative maps to cement their continued advantage and to pass laws making it far more difficult for eligible Americans to vote.
This drift toward full-throated opposition to democracy has played out for over 50 years. The inevitable turn from subverting democracy to attempting to overturn it outright it played out in the wake of the 2020 election, in which President Donald Trump and his supporters actively pushed for Republican officials in closely contested swing states to overturn the will of the voters. Ultimately, an angry mob invaded the Capitol on January 6, 2021, seeking to forcibly block Congress’s certification of the presidential election.
The fanciful notion that a post-Trump GOP will back away from its enmity toward democracy ignores that this phenomenon has been ongoing for nearly 60 years. The Republican Party’s positions on economic issues remain unpopular, so Republicans know they cannot win a fair fight. If their choice is to change their views or circumvent democracy, they will circumvent democracy. They’ve been doing it for decades.
The Republican Party is the enemy of democracy in America because democracy in America is the enemy of the Republican Party. The GOP’s war on democracy is the inevitable result of its inability to sell its ideas to the public, and as long as the public isn’t buying what Republicans are selling, the Republican Party will continue trying to overrule the public. They failed in 2020, but they’ll double down going forward.
A prominent sportswriter in the early 20th century, Hugh Keough, has been credited with a quote that is also quite relevant to political prognostication:
“The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but that’s the way to bet.”
My Twitter feed these days is abuzz with the notion that Democrats are going to buck the longstanding trend in which the “out” party–which is to say, the party that does not control the presidency–picks up seats in Congress during midterm elections.
Is it possible? Sure. Democrats made net gains in Congress in the 1998 midterms, and Republicans did so in 2002. Prior to that, the last time the “in” party netted seats in Congress was 1934. On a handful of rare occasions, notably the midterms of 1962, 1970 and 2018, the “in” party has picked up seats in one chamber of Congress, while losing a larger number of seats in the other chamber.
However, to say that it is unlikely would be a tremendous understatement. The near-constant of midterm elections cutting against the party holding the presidency is one of the most consistent, and time-tested, patterns in American politics. The likelihood of Democrats keeping the House of Representatives or taking an outright majority in the Senate after 2022 is so low that I would consider it foolhardy for anybody to bet any amount of money on that outcome.
It isn’t just 150-plus years of post-Civil War history that leads me to this conclusion. There are several factors coming into play that point to significant Republican wins in the 2022 midterm elections.
First, the “exception” midterms of 1934, 1998 and 2002 all occurred when the president at the time was exceedingly popular. In 1998 and 2002, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, respectively, were both polling above 65% approval. While there was no public polling on approval ratings in 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt was exceedingly popular at the time due to his leadership in combating the Great Depression.
With today’s partisan polarization, it is hard to imagine President Joe Biden being at 65% or higher in November 2022. Polarization alone would seem to render that all but impossible. But there’s also the fact of continued Republican obstruction, which means that President Biden will likely fail to pass very much substantive legislation. The public, not always especially discerning as to where to place the blame, usually blames the president and his party, not the opposition party in Congress, when things don’t go well.
Two Democratic Senators, Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, have ensured Republicans will continue to have the ability to obstruct the Democrats through 2022. By refusing to budge on ending the filibuster, the arcane rule requiring 60 votes out of 100 to end debate and bring a bill up for a vote, Manchin and Sinema have given the Republicans a veto over any Democratic legislation that might benefit the public. Republicans will use this veto to deny Biden any substantive victories, and Biden will get the blame for it from a largely uninformed public.
On the House side, it is a near-certainty that Republicans, who need to net only five seats for control, will gain those seats on the strength of redistricting alone. Because of Democratic failures to flip any state legislatures in the 2020 elections, Republicans remain in firm control of redistricting in most of the key swing states.
On the Senate side, most of the Republican-held seats that are up in 2022 are not promising targets for the Democrats. Their best shot at a pickup is in Pennsylvania, where Republican Senator Pat Toomey is not seeking reelection. There will also be vacancies in North Carolina and Ohio, but North Carolina still leans Republican, and Ohio has been trending heavily Republican for years. Democrats also may have a shot at flipping Wisconsin, where incumbent GOP Senator Ron Johnson is considering retiring, and Florida, though it appears very unlikely that any top Democrats will step up for a tough race against Republican Senator Marco Rubio. Of these five seats, Democrats would probably do really well to flip two, and one is much more likely.
But there are several vulnerable Democratic senators up in 2022, two of whom won special elections in 2020 by extremely close margins. With an electorate that is likelier than not to skew more Republican in 2022, Democratic Senators Mark Kelly of Arizona and Raphael Warnock of Georgia will face difficult challenges. Catherine Cortez Masto is up for reelection in closely divided Nevada, and Maggie Hassan may have to face off against popular Republican Governor John Sununu in New Hampshire. It would be no surprise if two or three of these Democrats lost, maybe even all four if 2022 is a bad year for Democrats.
The likeliest scenario in the Senate is a wash, which would mean continued 50-50 gridlock, or a modest GOP gain, which would deliver control of the chamber to the Republicans. Starting in 2023, President Biden is likely to face a Congress where at least one chamber is Republican-controlled, sharing the fate of the last two Democratic presidents, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. It is true that midterm losses for Clinton and Obama in 1994 and 2010 set the stage for resurgences by both presidents and their ultimate reelections two years later. However, it is also true that neither of those Democratic presidents ever had a governing majority in Congress again, and that they were succeeded by Republican presidents who inherited those Republican majorities in Congress.
The bottom line is that whatever little Democrats get done in Washington in the next two years is likely to be all they are going to get between now and 2033, at the earliest.
I have held off making any predictions about the Georgia Senate runoffs because I frankly have no idea what’s going to happen. The only thing I can say with any confidence is that I expect there will not be a split: either Democrats Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock will both win, or incumbent Republicans Kelly Loeffler and David Perdue will retain their seats.
We hear that there is a lot on the line, and superficially, this is true. If the Democrats win both seats, they will take control of a 50-50 Senate on the tie-breaking vote of Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris. If not, Republicans will continue to control the chamber and the agenda.
In reality, the outcome is not going to make a great deal of difference. As long as the filibuster remains in place, 60 votes will be required to advance any legislation. We already know that the votes will not be there to end the filibuster, as Senator Joe Manchin (D-West Virginia) has already stated flat-out that he will not vote to do so. Congressional Republicans have shown for more than a decade that they will give a Democratic president no cooperation, and there is no reason to expect that their stance will change. Frankly, obstructionism has worked very well for them, and because the overwhelming majority of them are in safe Republican constituencies, most of them will face no negative consequences for obstructing President-Elect Joe Biden.
In short, regardless of what happens next Tuesday, Democrats aren’t going to be able to pass very much of anything through the Senate. If they do get to a 50-50 tie, they might be able to pass some items through the budget reconciliation process, but this option is much more limited than a lot of people seem to think it is. The new president is going to have to rely heavily on executive orders to get any significant part of his agenda through, and that approach also has its limitations.
In short, President-Elect Biden will achieve very little of substance between his inauguration and the 2022 midterms, and given the longstanding patterns of American politics, this will play to the benefit of the obstructing party, the Republicans. Expect the GOP to block almost everything Biden tries to do, knowing that a poorly educated and highly polarized public will blame the president, not them. The end result is likely to be big Republican wins–and control of both chambers of Congress–in the 2022 midterms. Barring some major, unanticipated event–such as a terrorist attack that boosts Biden’s popularity into the stratosphere, as happened with George W. Bush heading into the 2002 midterms–substantial Republican victories in the 2022 midterms are as predictable as the sun rising in the east.
On the eve of the 2020 elections, it is clear that Joe Biden is a heavy favorite to win the presidency and become the next president of the United States. For Donald Trump to win would require either the largest collective polling error recorded since 1936, or a massive, government-orchestrated theft of an election that would shame even the lowest “third-world” tyrant.
At this point, the only question is the margin. As of today, I expect Biden to win all of the six key states that will determine the winner in the Electoral College. I further expect that he will win by clear margins in the three most important of those six states: Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. All available evidence points to these results.
To make my final projections, I am using the Real Clear Politics site (https://www.realclearpolitics.com), which I have chosen for two reasons: one, it has a very good, comprehensive listing of most available polling going back well over a year, and two, it tends to produce the least favorable results for Biden, as compared to other sites which aggregate polling data. To explain further—if Biden is clearly leading in a state at the RCP site, I believe one can count on him being ahead there.
First, let’s look at the three most pivotal states, the large “Rust Belt” states that gave Donald Trump the presidency in 2016. At this point, there is no way any reasonable person can look at the available data and conclude that Trump is not a significant underdog in these three pivotal states.
PENNSYLVANIA (20 electoral votes)
In 72 polls of Pennsylvania dating back to February, Trump has led two and been tied in three. He was trailing all polling in the Keystone State even before the COVID-19 pandemic shut down the country. There has been no notable movement in his direction. At this point, the evidence points to a projection of “Likely Democratic,” but I am going to keep Pennsylvania at “Leans Democratic” simply because the polling margins are somewhat close.
MICHIGAN (16 electoral votes)
In 61 polls of Michigan dating back to February, Trump has led four, none by more than 2%. All four of those polls were conducted by the Republican pollster Trafalgar. It is clearly “Likely Democratic,” and the only reason it cannot be moved into the “Safe Democratic” category is an abundance of caution based on the surprising results of 2016.
WISCONSIN (10 electoral votes)
In 59 polls of Wisconsin dating back to February, Trump has led three and has been tied in three. Two of his leads were by 1% each, both in polling done by the Republican pollster Trafalgar. Again, evidence clearly points to a projection of “Likely Democratic.”
Moving now to three other hotly contested states, it is clear again that Biden is ahead, although a Trump win in any of them would not be considered a major upset.
FLORIDA (29 electoral votes)
Of all of the six key states that will determine the election, Florida is the hardest one to project. That said, Biden has led in many more polls than Trump, even though the margins have typically been close. Disturbing reports of Biden doing poorly (relatively speaking) among Latinos in Florida certainly give one pause, but his surprising strength among older voters is important here too, and appears to be offsetting any softness in his Latino numbers. It appears that if Trump does win Florida, it will be by a margin similar to that of George W. Bush in 2000. If a candidate’s best case is a photo-finish, one can’t call him the favorite. I am going to bite the bullet and characterize Florida as “Tilts Democratic.”
NORTH CAROLINA (15 electoral votes)
There is no question about two facts: North Carolina is very close, and Biden has led the overwhelming majority of polls, particularly polls not conducted by Trafalgar or Rasmussen, also a Republican-leaning pollster. Unlike in other states that I consider part of the “Big Six”—the six key states that will decide the election—Trump has also led here in polls that are not clearly Republican skewed, though not recently. But most of the polling has favored Biden by a close but clear margin. Therefore, North Carolina has to be characterized as “Leans Democratic.”
ARIZONA (11 electoral votes)
Although Biden has led in the overwhelming majority of polling taken since February, Trump has moved ahead in three of the last seven polls. However, two of those three were conducted by Republican-leaning pollsters (Trafalgar and Rasmussen). I learned a hard lesson in 2016, which is that just because a pollster is partisan does not necessarily mean it is wrong. Their numbers have to be thrown in the averages. However, when the only polling showing a Republican lead is Republican-skewed, that factor also has to be taken into consideration. Right now, it is clear that Arizona is close, but also clear that Biden has a slight lead, and Arizona is, therefore, characterized as “Tilts Democratic.”
With Biden favored in all of the six key states, again, the key question here appears to be whether the election will turn into a landslide for Biden. Let’s now take a look at the four states that would be considered “Landslide Indicators” for Biden.
TEXAS (38 electoral votes)
There has been much Democratic exuberance in recent days about Texas, especially with the reports of heavy voting before election day. However, the overwhelming preponderance of polling, even in recent days, shows Trump maintaining a narrow but clear lead in the Lone Star State. It may be very close, possibly decided by 1% or 2%, but Trump is clearly ahead. There may be some post-election recriminations against Biden and charges that if he had spent more time and money in Texas that he could have won it, but it is vitally important to understand that Biden’s national strategy (which did not include a heavy push in Texas) was correct. Texas was always going to be a very heavy lift, and Biden’s prime directive was to nail down the three Rust Belt states that defeated Hillary Clinton in 2016. Heading into election day, he appears to have done that. Texas was never going to swing the election; it would only have been icing on the cake. At this point, Texas is narrowly, but clearly, “Leans Republican.”
OHIO (18 electoral votes)
Ohio is very close, but Biden in recent weeks has been ahead, even if only slightly, in all but the most partisan polls. I never thought very much of Biden’s chances in Ohio and never considered it a must-win state for him. It isn’t. He can certainly win without Ohio. But looking at the data, it is with surprising ease that I can characterize Ohio as “Tilts Democratic,” and I am only going with “tilts” rather than “leans” due to the closeness of the margins.
GEORGIA (16 electoral votes)
It is very, very clear that Georgia is extremely close. Of 28 polls taken since February, Trump has led 13, Biden has led 11, and there have been four ties. In the last eight polls, it has been 3-3-2. Very few of these polls have been conducted by blatantly partisan pollsters. Candidly, Georgia is a coin flip, and if I were going to characterize any state as a toss-up, that is where Georgia would land. However, if Biden truly is ahead nationally by more than 7% (and I believe, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that he is), then Georgia is fairly likely to flip. I am going to characterize Georgia as “Tilts Democratic.”
IOWA (6 electoral votes)
I will state categorically that the latest Des Moines Register poll, typically considered the “gold standard” of Iowa polling, was an outlier, and I have several reasons for this position that I won’t delve into here (except to say that its characterization of U.S. Rep. Abby Finkenauer trailing by 15% in District 1 was obviously very, very wrong; it is not a plausible result). But even if we completely throw that poll (Trump +7%) in the trash can, it is clear that several other quality pollsters show Trump very narrowly ahead in Iowa. It is a close call, but I consider Iowa “Tilts Republican.”
Now, let’s look briefly at some of the states that Hillary Clinton narrowly carried in 2016 and which Trump was hoping to contest. Trump has not led in Minnesota (10 electoral votes) in a single poll in the Real Clear Politics listing, dating back over a year. In Nevada, local political expert Jon Ralston has noted on Twitter that Democrats have built a 90,000-vote firewall in early voting and are clearly favored to win that state’s six electoral votes. Polling in Maine and New Hampshire, with four electoral votes each, has clearly shown Biden with wide margins. All four are characterized as “Likely Democratic.” Maine splits its electors, with two being given to the statewide winner and one each from the state’s two congressional districts. Maine-01 is “Safe Democratic.” Maine-02 appears, at this point, to be “Tilts Democratic.”
Additionally, I expect Biden to flip one electoral vote in Nebraska, which apportions its five electoral votes the same way Maine does. Nebraska-02 polling indicates that its single electoral vote should be considered “Likely Democratic,” with the state’s remaining four electoral votes “Safe Republican.”
The only other state that I do not feel I can characterize as safe for either Biden or Trump is Alaska, where the small amount of polling done (two polls) has averaged a 4.5% lead for Trump. Out of an abundance of caution, I am characterizing Alaska’s three electoral votes as “Likely Republican.”
The remaining 35 states, and the District of Columbia, can be safely characterized as either Safe Democratic or Safe Republican.
Safely Democratic constituencies include: California (55), New York (29), Illinois (20), New Jersey (14), Virginia (13), Washington (12), Massachusetts (11), Maryland (10), Colorado (9), Connecticut (7), Oregon (7), New Mexico (5), Hawaii (4), Rhode Island (4), Delaware (3), Vermont (3), the District of Columbia (3), and, as mentioned previously, the single electoral vote in Maine-01.
Safely Republican states include: Indiana (11), Tennessee (11), Missouri (10), Alabama (9), South Carolina (9), Kentucky (8), Louisiana (8), Oklahoma (7), Arkansas (6), Kansas (6), Mississippi (6), Utah (6), Idaho (4), Nebraska (4), West Virginia (4), Montana (3), North Dakota (3), South Dakota (3), and Wyoming (3).
In all, the breakdown indicates a Biden win of 369-169 in the electoral college, with 210 of those electoral votes considered safe Democratic and 49 considered likely Democratic. Those states alone would get Biden to 259 of the 270 electors he needs to win. Biden would then need to win only one of Florida, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, or Arizona to get over the top.
Understand that a number of these states may not be formally called or projected by the networks on election night, due to the unusually heavy volume of mail-in ballots brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. But Florida could tell us a lot, because it does have experience with mail ballots and typically counts those quickly. Even if Biden does not cross the 270 threshold election night, he should be clearly on track for victory.
U.S. SENATE
Shifting to the Senate, it appears that Democrats are on track to make a net gain of three seats, with two seats in Georgia likely headed to a December runoff. This would give Democrats a 50-48 advantage pending the outcome of those Georgia runoff elections.
As I have expected all along, I think Democrats are clear favorites to flip Republican-held Senate seats in three states: Colorado, Arizona and Maine. In Colorado, I consider former Democratic governor John Hickenlooper a safe bet to unseat incumbent Republican Cory Gardner. In Arizona, I consider Democrat Mark Kelly a likely winner over incumbent Republican Martha McSally. And in Maine, I expect Democratic House Speaker Sara Gideon likely to defeat incumbent Republican Susan Collins.
I also think Democrat Cal Cunningham is clearly ahead of incumbent Republican Thom Tillis in North Carolina, and I rate that race “Leans Democratic.”
Conversely, former Auburn University football coach Tommy Tuberville, a Republican, is a heavy favorite to defeat incumbent Democrat Doug Jones in Alabama, and I rate this race “Safe Republican.”
The closest race right now is in Iowa, where incumbent Republican Joni Ernst is locked in a tight battle with Democratic challenger Theresa Greenfield. If I were to characterize any Senate race as a tossup, it would be Iowa. However, recent polling (not just the clearly flawed Des Moines Register poll) makes it clear that the race has shifted back in Ernst’s direction, so I am calling Iowa “Tilts Republican.”
In Georgia, I think Democrats Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock will lead their races on election night, especially Warnock, who is running in a special election race with more than 20 candidates on the ballot. However, I would be surprised if either got to 50% in the final count, which means both races would go to a December runoff. History has shown that Democrats do not show up robustly in post-election runoffs, and so I am characterizing both races as “Runoff/Tilts Republican.”
Turning to other close races, I have never been bullish on the chances of five Democrats seeking Senate seats in strongly red states, and I remain skeptical that any of these five will win. I characterize Senate races in Alaska, Montana and South Carolina as “Lean Republican,” with Republican incumbents in all three states favored to win.
I consider Kansas, an open seat, to be “Likely Republican,” in part because of some past history in which a Senate race was polling closely there but ended up being a double-digit Republican victory. I simply don’t believe that the race in Kansas, which has not elected a Democrat to the U.S. Senate since 1932, is as close as the polling indicates.
And I have never moved Kentucky off of “Safe Republican” at any point in this election cycle. Democratic donors have wasted millions of dollars on the doomed candidacy of Amy McGrath, who has no chance whatsoever to defeat Majority Leader Mitch McConnell in this deep red state.
It is important to face reality, and here are the facts: Kentucky has not elected a non-incumbent Democrat to the U.S. Senate since 1972, or any Democrat at all to the Senate since 1992. The state has shifted heavily Republican in federal races since that time. Although Democrats often prevail in state-level races (such as the governorship), Kentucky is not alone in electing “out party” candidates to state-level races while steadfastly refusing to do so for federal-level races. (Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and Vermont are other current examples of this phenomenon). It would be surprising if this race is not called right away at 7 p.m. eastern on election night.
While Democrats have had a wide field on which to play, Republicans have had only other pickup opportunity aside from Alabama. That slight opening was in Michigan, and even that has never been better than an outside shot. It is clear that Democratic incumbent Gary Peters, whose small polling leads and poor fundraising had given hope to Republican challenger John James, is now pulling away, and I rate this race “Likely Democratic.”
Therefore, my expectation is that the final composition of the U.S. Senate will end up at 50-50, with Vice President Kamala Harris spending the next two years breaking tie votes. For those who do not understand how a landslide presidential victory can only produce a 50-50 tie in the Senate, understand that netting three seats is a pretty solid victory, and that the Senate, due to each state having equal representation, provides an artificial boost to the Republican Party. With heavily populated blue states like California each getting only two senators, the same as lightly populated red states like Wyoming, it is very difficult for Democrats to make big gains in the Senate.
U.S. HOUSE
Finally, shifting to the U.S. House, I believe that most prognosticators, as they did in 2018, are underestimating Democratic gains. Democrats won most of the seats that were available to them in their “Blue Wave” 40-seat pickup in 2018, but they left about 20 on the table that they lost by five points or less. After analyzing all the races and taking a look, particularly, at the Republicans who survived in suburban districts two years ago, I have come to the estimate of a +16 gain for Democrats this election, stretching their margin in the House to 248-187.
BOTTOM LINE
The end result would be a Democratic “trifecta,” meaning control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress. However, with only a 50-50 tie in the Senate, it would take just one Democratic senator (like West Virginia’s Joe Manchin, for example) to defeat Democratic legislation. As a result, progressive wish-list items such as ending the filibuster, expanding the Supreme Court and enacting sweeping health care reforms are all extremely unlikely to pass. This likely means continued dejection and disappointment on the Democrats’ far left, and possibly very big midterm losses in 2022. Whatever Democrats want to get done, they’d better get it done over the next two years.
FOOTNOTE: HISTORICAL ERROR RATE
Dating back to 2006, when I first began projecting the final outcomes of Congressional elections, my average miss on the final composition of the U.S. Senate has been 1.6 seats, and in the U.S. House, it has been 4.3 seats. If I remain within that range this election (not rounding up), the Senate could end up with anywhere from a 51-49 Republican majority to a 51-49 Democratic majority. Democrats could be expected to finish anywhere from +12 to +20 in the House, based on my past error rate.
In my last preview of the upcoming election, I wrote that I intended to publish a comprehensive Election Night Guide, as I typically do for most presidential elections. Unfortunately, due to a crush of both personal and professional commitments for the next week, some of which were unexpected, I am not going to have enough time to finish compiling the guide.
I will still publish a final overview of the election on the morning of Monday, November 2. While it will not go into the depth that my Election Night Guide traditionally has, it will still identify the key races to watch in terms of the presidential election and control of the U.S. Senate. Control of the U.S. House of Representatives appears to be a foregone conclusion at this point, so I will not focus on individual races.
For the presidential race, it has become apparent that the pivotal state, and likeliest tipping point, is Pennsylvania. It is the one state that I view as being crucial to both candidates, and one that neither candidate can probably win without. For control of the Senate, the likeliest tipping-point states are North Carolina and Iowa.
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